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CHAPTER I 
 
The Political Sorting of American Religious Behavior 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
One bedrock finding in the study of mass politics is that religious behavior affects 
political behavior. However, the successes of movements such as the Christian right have 
complicated matters. Using a variety of methods, I find that, as religious conservatism 
has become an exemplar of political conservatism, political behavior has come to affect 
the religious behavior of a significant number of Americans. Specifically, political 
predispositions are now a key factor for many individuals’ social integration and 
organizational satisfaction with evangelical Protestant churches. Republicans sort into 
while Democrats sort out of frequent attendance in these churches. The resulting void of 
Democrats in evangelical churches contributes to polarization of the broader political 
environment. 
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In 1986, only 8% of white Southern Baptists considered themselves to be strong 
Republicans. By 2004, the percentage of strong Republicans had tripled. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of strong Democrats attending Southern Baptist churches fell by almost half 
(General Social Survey 1972-2004). What explains this changing partisan composition? 
A common response is that churches have persuaded their members to become more 
Republican as the parties have taken distinct positions on moral issues. This answer is 
consistent with a long history of social science research treating the relationship between 
religion and politics as unidirectional. Since people are “born into” a religion, the 
conventional wisdom is that religious behavior must affect politics, a view encapsulated 
in foundational works in the study of mass behavior (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960). 
However, the relationship between religion and politics has become more 
complex. Quite apart from the notion that people are born into a religion, American 
religion is actually fluid (Wuthnow 1988). People make choices about both the role of 
faith in their lives and how intensely they are involved with religious organizations. Some 
churches take controversial positions on, and become strongly associated with, hot button 
political issues. I argue these trends combine to make politics a major factor for some 
people’s satisfaction and integration with churches as organizations. This weakens the 
commonly held scholarly understanding that religion affects politics but politics does not 
affect religion. I offer an alternative explanation for why religious affiliations have 
become more politically homogenous. People whose political preferences clash with the 
dominant political direction of a church become less involved with that church. 
Conversely, participation increases among those whose political preferences resonate 
with the dominant positions espoused in and about their church. Specifically, I 
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demonstrate that the intensifying divisiveness of moral and social issues has caused the 
causal arrow between political preferences and religious behavior to switch for members 
of evangelical Protestant denominations. 
My findings suggest the overall relationship between religion and politics is 
increasingly complicated. I argue that a substantial number of Americans choose to 
attend or sort into churches reflecting their political values, attitudes and worldviews 
embodied by partisanship, a pattern that likely results in an intensification of polarization 
within the United States. First, I offer a theory of how political preferences influence 
religious behavior. Then, I apply that theory to the United States, both in the 2000s and 
the 1970s. Using panel survey data, I show an evolution of the relationship between 
religion and politics culminating in a finding of strong effects of party on religious 
behavior but not significant effects of religious behavior on party. 
 
A Generalized Process of Political Change in Churches 
 
Individuals receive political information about a church from many sources. Most 
obviously, pastors discuss politically relevant topics during church services (Brewer et al. 
2003). Informal social networks within churches also transmit political information 
(Djupe and Gilbert 2009). People glean political information about churches from the 
broader social environment as well.
1
 For instance, many who have never attended a 
                                                 
1
 During the 2000s, just under three-fifths of New York Times articles (311 of 528) that 
contained the phrase “Southern Baptist” also contained the words “conservative”, 
“Republican”, or both (Lexis-Nexis). 
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Southern Baptist church often recognize the Southern Baptist churches as organizations 
with a decidedly conservative political bent. 
Political information about churches can trigger two mechanisms with the 
potential to change religious behavior. One mechanism is psychological; political 
messages in church can cause either affirmation or unpleasantness. The other mechanism 
is social; politics can enhance or compromise social integration in a church. Both 
mechanisms have the potential to affect organizational satisfaction, initiating a process of 
neglect (Withey and Cooper 1989). 
Political messages in church sometimes deviate from people’s prior understanding 
of the world. The clash of messages from a church with a person’s prior political 
understanding can compromise a person’s ability to preserve a concept of self that is 
stable, competent, and morally good (Festinger 1957). Because such instances are 
psychologically unpleasant or “dissonant,” it can lead to change, either in religious or 
political behavior. Traditionally, scholars assume that individuals adapted their political 
preferences to meet their church, but neutralizing a source of conflicting information can 
also reduce dissonance. For people conflicted by a church, this means evaluating the 
church experience less favorably than they would if they rarely experienced discomfort. 
In the diminished favorability of the church, the individual becomes a member of an 
organization that provides declining satisfaction. 
For others, political information in a church is not contradictory or dissonant. 
Some members of a church may criticize gay marriage legalization in front of another 
member with a similar opinion. Likewise, a pastor might deliver a sermon admonishing a 
court decision before a similarly minded congregant. These consonant political messages 
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could enhance well-being by providing adherents with a narrative that affirms prior 
beliefs and a consistent view of the world (Jost et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2008). Therefore, 
consonant political messages can increase satisfaction with a church. 
In addition to this psychological mechanism, politics can influence churches 
through a social mechanism. Church-based social networks carry political information 
(Djupe and Gilbert 2009), and politics influences social connections (Alford et al. 2011; 
McPherson 2001). Politics can strengthen or weaken social ties in a church in several 
ways. Church members can either directly clash or agree about issues. For the former, the 
experience may be unpleasant. For the latter, it might be reinforcing (Mutz 2006). 
Moreover, those who agree about politics are likely to agree about other aspects of life as 
well (Hillygus and Shields 2008). As a result, political “minorities” in a church may feel 
like they just do not “fit in” with fellow church goers, while people in line with the 
dominant attitudes of their congregation may be more likely to corroborate with 
coreligionists on a wide-array of non-political matters such as business and social 
outings. Enhanced social integration then aids in maintaining long-term involvement with 
the organization (Kim and Rhee 2010; Kuipers 2009; O’Reilly et al. 1989). 
In the end, political messages associated with churches can influence social ties 
and psychological well-being. These factors, in turn, can reduce or increase satisfaction 
with a church as an organization. When organizational satisfaction is high or improving, 
people are more likely to be heavily invested in their church. When organizational 
satisfaction is low or declining, people are more likely to respond by exiting or neglecting 
their prior commitments (Hirschman 1970; Rusbult et al. 1988). By exit, I mean the 
abandonment of an organization- leaving or switching churches. By neglect, I mean 
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disengaging from an organization through declines in attendance, donating, volunteering, 
and other forms of organizational investment. In the case of a religious organization, 
neglect is particularly likely, in so far as it is a compromising response to dissatisfaction 
that allows a person to retain both their political and religious social identities. 
 
Political Change in Contemporary Evangelical Churches 
 
Because the groups who experience satisfaction or dissatisfaction change across 
place and time, the process described above ought to depend on context. In the 
contemporary United States, it applies primarily to members of evangelical Protestant 
churches. Evangelical churches have great directional clarity in political messages. While 
a few evangelical churches promote policies favored by Democrats, the overwhelming 
majority of evangelical churches are associated with the Republican Party.
2
 Their 
associated messages on issues such as abortion and gay marriage are emotional, salient, 
and easily-understood (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001) lending enough 
potency to disrupt what is often viewed as a deep seated and private activity. This 
characteristic is strengthened in a well-sorted political environment (Hetherington 2009). 
Furthermore, political messages associated with evangelicals are ubiquitous, originating 
from the broad political environment and from the evangelical religious elites who often 
express their conservatism (Hunter 1991; Hunter 2010).
3
 
                                                 
2
 Examples of liberal evangelicals include Jim Wallis and President Jimmy Carter. 
3
 Environmental heuristics have been clear about evangelicals for some time; more than 
twice as many people could not offer an opinion about the general favorability of 
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In contrast, most Catholics and mainline Protestants do not experience such 
intense, clear, and ubiquitous opportunities for political dissonance or consonance. 
Political information outside of evangelical churches does not overwhelmingly favor 
Republicans (Putnam and Campbell 2010). Similarly, mainline Protestant clergy tend to 
discuss issues like homosexuality in less divisive language (Olson and Cadge 2002). And, 
African-Americans typically lack clear directions in political messages in churches as 
many churches advocate some Republican social policies (Sherkat et al. 2010) while 
maintaining a clear preference for many Democratic economic policies (Brown 2009). 
In addition, the experience of altering religious behavior to accommodate 
personal preferences is far less common outside of evangelical churches. Evangelicals 
have more market choices, closer substitute churches, and fewer social pressures against 
“shopping” for churches (Sherkat 2001; Smith and Sikkink 2003). Consequently, in the 
contemporary context, the religious behavior of mainline Protestants and Catholics is not 
likely to be influenced by the alignment of a person’s political preferences with the 
positions associated with his or her church. 
Overall, the theory offers a clear, testable hypothesis for contemporary 
evangelicals. Because Republicans are most likely to integrate with fellow congregants 
and receive consonant political information in churches, evangelical Republicans are 
most likely to experience high satisfaction and to attend with high frequency. Because 
Democrats are most likely to receive dissonant political information and not integrate 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lutherans or Presbyterians than those who had no such opinion about Baptists (Barna 
1991). 
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with fellow congregants, evangelical Democrats are most likely to experience low 
satisfaction and to attend with low frequency. 
Though expectations are consistent with findings of Patrikios (2008), they extend 
from a distinct theoretical process. Contrary to a notion of “American Republican 
Religion”, the theoretical process leading to politicized churches is not because 
Republicans have a special individual characteristic leading them to attend church more 
frequently than Democrats. Rather, evangelical American Republicans should attend 
church more frequently than Democrats because their churches, on average, are 
associated with Republican politics. However, this association is not constant over 
region, denomination, or congregation, leading to expectation of heterogeneous effects of 
political preferences across groups, individuals, and time. Republican members could 
decrease in frequency of attendance while Democratic members could increase in 
churches associated with Democratic political preferences. Though, leaders of many of 
today’s liberal mainline churches are likely too subtle in communicating their preferences 
to alter organizational satisfaction (Neiheisel and Djupe 2008; Olson and Cadge 2002). 
Nonetheless, if the religious left somehow outpaced the religious right in growth and 
political intensity, American Republican Religion could become American Democratic 
Religion. 
This is not to say that politics is the foremost force guiding religious behavior. On 
the contrary, only a handful of scholars have identified politics as an important 
independent variable (Campbell et al. n.d.; Hout and Fischer 2002; Patrikios 2008) while 
many have recognized several groups of factors that influence religious behavior. The 
first group is family socialization (Bader and Desmond 2006; Bao et al. 1999; Dudley 
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and Laurent 1989; Ellison and Sherkat 1990; Hunsberger 1984; Nelsen 1980; Nelsen 
1981; Ozorak 1989; Perkins 1987). The second group is composed of demographic 
explanations such as gender and age (Alston 1979; Batson et al. 1993; Hunt and Hunt 
2000; Kalmijin 1998; Krause 2003; Krause 2005; Nash and Berger 1962; Shibley 1996; 
Smith et al. 1998). Finally, the third group hinges on contextual circumstances faced by 
the individual such as church characteristics and religious market forces (Ammerman 
1995; Chaves 2006; Dyck and Starke 1999; Iannacconne 1994; Kelley 1977; Mark 2003; 
Stern 1999). Consequently, politics does not explain all variance in church attendance. 
Other non-political factors will decide many people’s religious behavior. Nonetheless, 
politics in churches should significantly influence behavior  of a sizeable portion of the 
population. 
 
Expectations and Research Design 
 
The investigation of this theory has three parts. First, I show a powerful effect of 
partisanship on religious behavior among evangelicals through analysis of the 2000-2004 
American National Election Study panel survey, while finding that church attendance 
does not have a similar influence on partisanship. Second, I examine heterogeneity of 
political effects within individuals to test who is more likely to change religious behavior 
because of politics. I find that party identification has robust effects among evangelicals 
for whom politics is central, but not for those for whom it is peripheral. Third, I apply the 
theory to another context and investigate heterogeneity of effects over time by replicating 
contemporary models with data from the 1972-1976 American National Election Study 
10 
 
panel survey, finding that church attendance had a significant influence on party during 
this period. 
I use panel data to establish the direction of causation. Religious leaders, the 
broad environment, and church based social networks transmit political messages often 
with persuasive intent. Those who attend church frequently have higher exposure to this 
same political information. Consequently, religious behavior could also influence 
partisan attachments. Indeed, this has been the conventional wisdom. The same process 
that theoretically affects attendance change could also lead to partisan change. Panel data 
are well suited to address the basic causal problem. Finding a significant relationship 
between a dependent variable and an independent variable measured at a time prior to the 
dependent variable is meaningful evidence that the independent variable is driving the 
relationship. Similarly, not finding such a relationship is strong evidence that the 
independent variable does not influence the dependent variable. 
The central dependent variable in my models is frequency of church attendance, a 
commonly used indicator of religious behavior.
4
 Party identification and a dummy 
variable indicating if the respondent belongs to a church within an evangelical 
                                                 
4
 Survey respondents often over-report their frequency church attendance, largely out of a 
social desirability bias (Hadaway et al. 1993; Hadaway et al. 1998; also see Hout and 
Greely 1998; Smith 1998). And, members of fundamentalist religious groups have a 
relatively high non-response rate leading to potential sampling bias (Sherkat 2007). 
Neither of these concerns is condemning. Over-reporting error is more of a concern in 
overtime comparison of aggregate religious behavior than in the analysis here. At worst, 
non-response rates among some fundamentalists constrain degrees of freedom. 
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denomination are explanatory variables in all models. I also create an interaction between 
the two, which allows me to assess whether party’s effect is more robust for evangelicals 
than for those from other religious traditions. The interaction will reflect party’s 
additional influence among evangelicals.
5
 
Although the truth is undoubtedly more complicated, I assume for empirical 
purposes that political messages in and around evangelical Protestant churches in the 
United States generally are consistent with the Republican Party. This assumption is 
consistent with the overall distribution of evangelical churches’ political leanings. To the 
extent that this assumption is violated, it will only serve to undermine my results, not 
enhance them. Hence the estimates derived from my models are likely quite conservative. 
I limit samples to Protestants and Catholics. This isolates variation to allow 
meaningful comparisons of evangelicals with the reference category, Catholics and non-
evangelical Protestants. I do not analyze the behavior of non-Protestants and non-
Catholics for two reasons. First, the most politically active religious organizations in the 
United States are Catholic or Protestant. Second, sample sizes of non-Catholics and non-
Protestants are too small for meaningful conclusions.
6
 In addition, I limit the sample to 
                                                 
5
I follow Steensland et al. (2000:294) in defining evangelical Protestants as those who are 
members of churches that “have typically sought more separation from the broader 
culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught strict 
adherence to particular religious doctrines.” Lists of Protestant denominations coded as 
mainline or evangelical follow appear in Supporting Information A. 
6
 Cell sizes would be in the single digits for many non-Christian groups. For example, 
only four Muslims appear in one of the datasets (NES 2000-2004 Panel). 
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whites. Because many churches are racially homogenous (Dougherty 2003), minorities 
who identify as evangelical Protestants are unlikely to be members of churches favoring 
Republican policies. 
 
Establishing Causation – Panel Models of Party and Church Attendance 
 
I employ a two-part test of the influence of partisanship on religion using the 
2000-2004 American National Election Panel study. First, I establish that lagged 
partisanship has a significant effect on contemporaneous church attendance for 
evangelicals even when controlling for lagged church attendance and a host of other 
variables. Next, I find that lagged church attendance does not have a significant effect on 
contemporaneous partisanship. 
 
The Influence of Party on Church Attendance 
 
A simple comparison of means shows major differences between partisans in their 
proclivity to change in frequency of church attendance between 2000 and 2004. 
Regardless of religious tradition or partisan affiliation, the average respondent declined at 
least slightly in attendance frequency between 2000 and 2004 (mean: -0.05; std. dev 
1.17).
7
 However, evangelical Democrats declined eight times more than evangelical 
                                                 
7
 Party’s seven values range from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican). 
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Republicans (-0.67 compared to -0.08; p <.05). In contrast, the partisan difference in 
decline was negligible among non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics.
8
 
These patterns become even more distinct in the multivariate context. In Table 1, 
I present estimates from a model of church attendance frequency, as measured in 2004. 
Partisan identification, a dummy variable for being an evangelical Protestants, and their 
interaction, all measured in 2000, are the independent variables of principal interest. 
Frequency of church attendance in 2000 is present as a covariate, making other estimates 
on the right hand side reflect change in frequency of church attendance between 2000 and 
2004 (Kelly and Keele 2006). I recoded all independent variables on 0-1 intervals and 
employed ordered probit regression. 
Estimates follow theoretical expectations. The main effect of party is not 
significant (coef: 0.156; s.e.: 0.159), suggesting party has no effect on non-evangelicals.
9
 
However, the interaction between party and the evangelical Protestant dummy is 
substantively and statistically significant in the expected direction (coef: 1.381; s.e: 
0.407). This means the effect of party is significantly greater for evangelicals than for 
Catholics and non-evangelical Protestants. Among evangelical Protestants, party in 2000 
                                                 
8
 The 9/11 terrorist attack occurred between surveys. However, as Putnam (2002) 
observed, the attacks did not produce long-term effects on church attendance. 
9
 Models combine both Catholics and non-evangelical Protestants in the reference 
category. Supporting Information B reports an extension of the model in Table 1 that 
includes an additional interaction between party and a Catholic dummy variable. Party’s 
effect among Catholics is substantively similar to party’s effect among non-evangelical 
Protestants (Catholic interaction: coef. 0.0446, std. error 0.315).  
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is positively associated with church attendance in 2004, even when controlling for lagged 
church attendance. 
 
Table 1: Church Attendance as a Function of Lagged Partisanship, 2000-2004 Panel 
 
Param. Est (Std. Error) 
Party00 0.156 (0.159) 
Evangelical00 x Party00 1.381*** (0.407) 
Evangelical00 -0.733** (0.280) 
Prayer Frequency00 0.490* (0.223) 
Biblical Literalism00 -0.627** (0.203) 
Age 0.570* (0.280) 
Education00 0.228 (0.181) 
Female 0.048 (0.105) 
South00 -0.172 (0.122) 
Attendance00 3.088*** (0.212) 
cut 1 0.596* (0.251) 
cut 2 1.328*** (0.254) 
cut 3 1.975*** (0.261) 
cut 4 2.901*** (0.276) 
cut 5 3.870*** (0.289) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.247  
N 464  
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. Ordered probit estimates. Dependent 
variable is 6-pt. church attendance in 2004. Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample 
limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
 
A strong Democrat evangelical has about a 6% probability of attending church weekly.
 10
 
This probability increases fivefold for a strong Republican to a statistically distinct 34%. 
Similarly, a simulated strong Democrat evangelical has less than a 1% chance of 
attending more than weekly while a strong Republican has a 17% probability. Figure 1 
                                                 
10
 All predicted probabilities were calculated in Stata using Long’s post-estimation 
command (Long and Freese 2005) and simulate a female not in the South with other 
characteristics at their sample means. 
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shows the effect of party on the cumulation of three high attendance categories: almost 
weekly, weekly, and more than weekly. Strong Republican’s 83% chance of high 
attendance is over three times greater than 28% chance of high attendance for strong 
Democrats. Partisan differences are also stark in likelihood of low attendance. The effect 
of party among evangelicals is between two and three times greater than first order 
effects of prayer frequency and age, variables of recognized importance for church 
attendance frequency.
11
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Because the theory addresses change in frequency of church attendance, substantive 
effects of party can also be discussed in term of change in attendance from 2000 to 2004. 
Supporting Information C reports models re-estimated by transforming Yt, with church 
attendance at Yt-1 on the right hand side, into Yt –Yt-1. 
Non-Evangelicals
Diff: 0.06 (not significant)
Evangelicals
Diff: 0.55 (p <.05)
0.56 
0.28 
0.62 
0.83 
Figure 1:  
The Effect of Party in 2000 on the Probability of Attending Church Almost 
Weekly or More in 2004 
Strong Democrat Strong Republican
Predicted probabilities based on the model in Table 1. Results are for female non-southerners with other 
characteristics, including lagged attendance, at their means. Church attendance is on  a 0-5 scale. Values 
are based on combination of almost weekly, weekly, and more than weekly probabilities. 
16 
 
The (Lack of) Influence of Church Attendance on Party 
 
I test the competing hypothesis that evangelical church attendance does not 
influence party identification using the 2000-2004 NES panel survey. The OLS model of 
seven-point 2004 party identification appears in Table 2. The key independent variables 
are church attendance in 2000, a dummy variable for evangelicals, and an interaction 
between church attendance and the evangelical indicator. Party in 2000 is also included 
on the right hand side of the model. Other right-hand side variables include ideology, 
income, gender, education, and residency in the South. All independent variables are on a 
0-1 interval and are from 2000 measurements. 
 
Table 2: Partisanship as a Function of Lagged Church Attendance, 2000-2004 Panel 
 
Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Attendance00 0.250 (0.187) 
Evangelical00 x Attendance00 0.007 (0.374) 
Evangelical00 0.055 (0.253) 
Conservatism00 0.884*** (0.251) 
Income00 -0.066 (0.388) 
South00 -0.041 (0.128) 
Female -0.027 (0.115) 
Education00 -0.132 (0.190) 
Party00 5.210*** (0.190) 
Constant -0.080 (0.213) 
Adj. R
2
 0.785  
N 404  
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. OLS regression. Dependent variable 
is 7-pt. party in 2004. Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample limited to white 
Protestants and Catholic. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
 
 
Church attendance in 2000 does not have a significant effect on party in 2004. 
The main effect is not statistically significant from zero (coef: 0.250; s.e.: 0.187), and the 
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interaction is not statistically different from  the main effect (coef: 0.007 s.e.: 0.374). The 
effect of lagged attendance is substantively trivial for both evangelicals and non-
evangelicals. As shown in Figure 2, evangelicals who attend more than weekly have a 
predicted party identification at 3.48. Evangelicals who never attend have an indistinct 
predicted party identification at 3.23. Among both evangelicals and non-evangelicals, the 
difference in 2004 party between a person who never attends church in 2000 and one who 
attends more than weekly is about 0.25, roughly 3% of the total 7-point scale of party.
12
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Following the same transformation approach noted above and detailed in Supporting 
Information C, change in party identification between 2000 and 2004 has a theoretical 
range of 5 (increase) to -5 (decrease). The difference in change between a person who 
never attends church in 2000 and one who attends more than weekly is indiscernible from 
zero at 0.229 for non-evangelicals and 0.284 for evangelical 
Non-Evangelicals
Diff: 0.25 (not significant)
Evangelicals
Diff: 0.26 (not significant)
 3.23   3.28  
 3.48   3.54  
Figure 2:  
The Effect of Church Attendance in 2000 on Party Identification in 2004 
Never Attend in 2000 Attend More than Weekly in 2000
Predicted values of party identification from estimates in Table 2. Results are for female non-
southerners with other characteristics, including lagged party, at their means. Party is on  a 0-6 scale. 
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Because party’s effect on church attendance is far more important for evangelicals 
than other groups, the hypothesis arguing that church attendance is driving party would 
call for attendance to be a more powerful predictor of party identification for evangelicals 
than for non-evangelicals. However, the effect of attendance on party is insignificant for 
evangelicals just as it is for non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics. The combination 
of results in Tables 1 and 2 provides confidence that partisanship influences church 
attendance for contemporary evangelical Protestants, but church attendance does not 
influence partisanship. These findings provide considerable support for the argument that 
the causal arrow only points one way among contemporary evangelicals- from 
partisanship to religious behavior, a direction contrary to conventional scholarly 
understanding. 
An alternative explanation of these results is that party serves as a proxy for 
religious belief. Such an alternative argues that Republicans have a more intense creed or 
spirituality, which, in turn, promotes frequent attendance. Or, in starker terms, Democrats 
are not responding to political alienation but rather their decline in attendance is because 
they are not as faithful as Republicans. If this was true, it would compromise causal 
inferences drawn from previous findings. 
However, this alternative explanation is unlikely. Religious belief and religious 
behavior are conceptually distinct. Prayer frequency is a commonly used measure of 
intensity of belief. Party makes no difference in the prayer frequency of white 
evangelicals. On a 0-1 interval of prayer frequency, Democrats and Democratic-leaning 
independents register a mean prayer frequency of 0.741 (American National Election 
Study 2000-2004 Panel). Republicans and Republican-leaning independents have an 
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indistinguishable (p = 0.68) mean of 0.748. Overall, the variation in prayer frequency 
between traditions is greater than variation within traditions. The 0.112 difference in 
prayer frequency between evangelicals and non-evangelicals who attend church at least a 
few times years is both statistically significant (p < 0.001) and over seventeen times 
greater than the 0.007 difference between Democrat and Republican evangelicals. 
 
Who Changes Religious Behavior because of Political Preferences? 
 
Although results suggest that, on average, evangelicals’ political preferences 
affect religious behavior, the effects may not be equal for all evangelicals. For some, 
religion is too central to their lives to be influenced by politics. And, for others, politics is 
simply too peripheral to cause satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Centrality ought to moderate 
the relationship between religious behavior and political preference. When a person does 
not hold politics central, it is unlikely to cause much change in other attitudes of 
behaviors (Converse 1964). Similarly, when a person holds religion central, he or she has 
ample reason to ignore whatever political dissonance he or she might encounter. People 
who care deeply about religion are less likely to decrease in attendance while those who 
care deeply about politics are more likely to change. If I find such a pattern of results, it 
would increase confidence in my findings. 
I continue with the 2000-2004 American National Election Study to construct 
three indices for testing these conditional hypotheses. One index measures political 
centrality. Another index measures religious centrality. Both religious and political 
centrality measures use a combination of subjective and objective indicators. A final 
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index measures political centrality relative to religious centrality by subtracting the 
religious centrality measure from the political centrality measures. Indices rely on 2000 
measures from the 2000-2004 NES Panel Survey and are coded to 0-1 intervals ranging 
from low to high centrality.
13
 
I replicate the basic model from Table 1 and split the sample according to high 
and low values of these three indices. Estimates for the ensuing six models, two for each 
of the three centrality indices, appear in Table 3. Findings are consistent with theoretical 
expectations. In all models, lagged attendance affects contemporaneous attendance. 
While the main effect of party is always insignificant, the interaction is significant in 
three of the six models, representing scenarios when religious centrality is low, when 
political centrality is high, and when religious centrality is low relative to political 
centrality. 
The sample in Model 1 in Table 3 is limited to those who scored above 0.5 on the 
index of religious centrality while the sample in Model 2 is limited to those in the sample 
who scored below this 0.5 value. As expected, the main effect of party is not significant 
in either model. However, the interaction is significant when religious centrality is low 
(coef: 2.702; s.e. 0.714), but not when religious centrality is high (coef: 0.765; s.e. 0.532). 
Party matters for evangelical church attendance when religion is less important, but party 
does not matter when religion is very important. Strong Republicans who do not hold 
religion as central have an 87% probability of attending at least once or twice a month. 
Meanwhile, the likelihood of frequent attendance drops to just over 5% for Democratic 
evangelicals with low centrality of religion. 
                                                 
13
 Supporting Information D details index construction. 
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Table 3: Church Attendance as a Function of Partisanship Conditioned by 
Centrality Measures, 2000-2004 Panel 
 Religious Centrality Political Centrality Religion vs. Politics 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Conditional: 
Religious 
Centrality 
High 
Religious 
Centrality 
Low 
Political 
Centrality 
High 
Political 
Centrality 
Low 
Politics 
Relatively 
High 
Politics 
Relatively 
Low 
 
Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party00 0.341 0.043 0.109 0.405 0.029 0.510 
 (0.257) (0.207) (0.187) (0.319) (0.185) (0.331) 
Evangelical00 x Party00 0.765 2.702*** 1.850*** 0.810 1.743*** 0.292 
 (0.532) (0.714) (0.522) (0.695) (0.524) (0.707) 
Evangelical00 -0.106 
-
1.871*** 
-
1.248*** 0.026 -1.095** 0.131 
 
(0.371) (0.486) (0.377) (0.447) (0.348) (0.508) 
Prayer Frequency00 0.100 0.660* 0.410 0.799* 0.523* 0.151 
 
(0.409) (0.294) (0.271) (0.408) (0.256) (0.477) 
Biblical Literalism00 -0.560* -0.601* -0.622** -0.683* -0.507* -0.656* 
 
(0.293) (0.293) (0.260) (0.335) (0.256) (0.349) 
Age 0.511 0.770* 0.586 1.376* 0.571 0.930 
 
(0.441) (0.376) (0.434) (0.656) (0.424) (0.690) 
Education00 0.467 0.039 0.231 0.256 0.225 0.224 
 
(0.287) (0.238) (0.220) (0.330) (0.218) (0.344) 
Female 0.118 0.005 0.052 0.108 0.023 0.074 
 
(0.159) (0.143) (0.126) (0.197) (0.126) (0.210) 
South00 -0.268 -0.026 -0.105 -0.432* -0.145 -0.252 
 
(0.172) (0.179) (0.146) (0.234) (0.149) (0.229) 
Attendance00 2.615*** 3.597*** 2.873*** 3.670*** 2.854*** 3.746*** 
 (0.328) (0.310) (0.258) (0.396) (0.248) (0.446) 
cut 1 0.575 0.606 0.473 1.603** 0.612 0.859 
 
(0.464) (0.326) (0.346) (0.530) (0.347) (0.570) 
cut 2 1.032* 1.512*** 1.162*** 2.493*** 1.334*** 1.653** 
 
(0.462) (0.331) (0.347) (0.547) (0.351) (0.570) 
cut 3 1.607*** 2.241*** 1.828*** 3.165*** 1.984*** 2.319*** 
 
(0.467) (0.345) (0.354) (0.569) (0.358) (0.591) 
cut 4 2.467*** 3.292*** 2.709*** 4.285*** 2.898*** 3.368*** 
 
(0.481) (0.376) (0.368) (0.614) (0.374) (0.627) 
cut 5 3.416*** 4.337*** 3.623*** 5.433*** 3.828*** 4.465*** 
 
(0.494) (0.405) (0.381) (0.644) (0.388) (0.647) 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.261 0.228 0.312 0.206 0.280 
N 212 252 313 151 317 147 
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. Ordered probit estimates. Dependent variable is 6-pt. 
church attendance in 2004. Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample limited to Protestant and Catholic 
whites. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
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Estimates for political centrality follow the trend established by religious 
centrality. Party only matters for an evangelical’s religious behavior when politics is 
central to that person. Model 3 in Table 3 reflects those who hold politics as highly 
central. Model 4 in Table 3 reflects those who do not hold politics as central. The samples 
are split at the 45 percentile. In both models, the main estimate for party remains 
insignificant. The interaction is insignificant in Model 4 (coef: 0.571; s.e. 0.590), when 
political centrality is relatively low. However, the interaction is highly significant (p < 
.001) in Model 3 (coef: 1.850; s.e. 0.522), when a person scores in the upper portion of 
the political centrality index. High attendance is dramatically different between partisans 
with high political centrality. A simulated strong Democrat evangelical with high 
political centrality has a 13% probability of attending church at least almost weekly while 
a comparable strong Republican has over an 80% probability. 
The third index subtracting political centrality from religious centrality yields 
further confirmation that political preferences affect religious behavior when politics is 
relatively important or when religion is relatively unimportant. Those in Model 5 are 
above the mean in the measure of political centrality minus religious centrality and care 
more about politics relative to religion than those in Model 6. Again, weak estimates for 
the main effect of party imply that partisan influence is constrained to evangelicals. The 
interaction variable is not significant for those evangelicals in the lower third of the 
relative index, as shown by the 0.292 coefficient (s.e 0.707) in Model 6. However, the 
significant interaction in Model 5 (coef: 1.743; s.e. 0.524) reflects a powerful effect of 
party for those evangelicals in the upper two-thirds of the relative index. An evangelical 
strong Democrat with high political centrality relative to religious centrality has a scant 
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10% chance of attending at least almost weekly, significantly less than the 70% chance of 
her simulated strong Republican counterpart. 
Party changes religious behavior when either religious centrality is low or when 
political centrality is high. When religion and politics compete, politics “wins” when a 
person places more emphasis on politics relative to religion compared to the typical 
person. On the other hand, a person’s religious behavior can be immune to political 
influence if that person holds religion with great centrality. 
 
Partisanship’s Influence on Religious Behavior prior to the Rise of Christian Right 
 
The relationship between political preferences and religious behavior has evolved 
over the last half-century. Despite the strong findings that political preferences influence 
church attendance of contemporary evangelicals, politics likely did not have such effects 
in prior decades. The contextual conditions underlying the present relationship between 
religion and politics have not been the norm until relatively recently. The direction and 
intensity of political information in evangelical churches has not always been clear, 
eliminating a context with ample opportunities for cognitive strife, compromised social 
integration, and subsequently altered organizational satisfaction. 
Prior to the rise of the Christian right between 1980 and 1992, major evangelical 
groups still maintained the historical norm of favoring strict separation of church and 
state (Jelen 2010). Affiliations such as the Southern Baptist Conventions had many 
members across the political spectrum. A full 62% of white evangelical Protestants 
identified with the Democratic Party in 1972 (General Social Survey 1972-2004). 
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Moreover, evangelicals often supported politicians of both parties as evidenced by Jimmy 
Carter’s heavy reliance on their support. Carter’s 54% of the white evangelical vote in 
1976 was roughly twice that of John Kerry’s in 2004 (General Social Survey 1972-2004). 
Consequently, prior to 1980, Democratic evangelicals should be no more likely than 
Republican evangelicals to decrease church attendance and the coefficient of the 
evangelical and party interaction should be insignificant. 
I test this hypothesis using the 1972-1976 American National Election Study 
Panel Survey. I replicate as closely as possible the contemporary model of church 
attendance from Table 1. Because data limitations bar an exact replication, I include 
reduced versions of the 2000-2004 models alongside models using the earlier survey.
14
 
Table 4 reports estimates for for both dependent variables of church attendance and 
partisan identification. All independent variables are lagged to either 1972 or 2000. 
Dependent variables are from 1976 or 2004. 
Results generally support theoretical expectations. The main effect of party 
remains insignificant (coef. 0.174; s.e. 0.146) and the interaction between party and being 
evangelical remains powerful (coef. 0.905; s.e. 0.356) in the truncated model of 2004 
church attendance. However, estimates from the 1970s depict a different relationship. 
Partisanship is statistically significant in 1976 (coef. 0.264; s.e. 0.120), suggesting that 
mainline Protestant and Catholic churches may have experienced a relatively weak  
 
                                                 
14
 The “more than weekly” attendance response was not available in the older surveys. 
For replication purposes, I collapse responses in the later survey of “more than weekly” 
into the “weekly” category. 
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Table 4: Comparing the Party and Church Attendance’s Relationship 1976 vs. 2004 
Frequency of Church Attendance as a Function of Lagged Party 
Dependent Variable Year: 1976 2004 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Param. Est. (Std. Error) Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Party (lagged) 0.255* (0.128) 0.219 (0.164) 
Party x Evangelical (lagged) -0.355 (0.237) 1.383** (0.427) 
Evangelical (lagged) 0.275* (0.146) -0.554* (0.282) 
Age (lagged) 0.342 (0.226) 0.815* (0.367) 
Education (lagged) 0.192 (0.136) 0.071 (0.177) 
South (lagged) -0.024 (0.090) -0.230* (0.125) 
Female (lagged) 0.123 (0.072) 0.041 (0.107) 
Church Attendance (lagged) 2.574*** (0.112) 2.857*** (0.169) 
Cut 1 0.281 (0.148) 0.893*** (0.268) 
Cut 2 1.517*** (0.151) 1.590*** (0.271) 
Cut 3 1.996*** (0.155) 2.210*** (0.278) 
Cut 4 2.580*** (0.161) 3.073*** (0.291) 
Pseduo R2 0.198 
 
0.250 
 
N 1,004 
 
495 
 Party as a Function of Lagged Frequency of Church Attendance 
Year: 1976 2004 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Param. Est. (Std. Error) Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Church Attendance (lagged) -0.141 (0.121) 0.241 (0.161) 
Church Attendance x Evangelical (lagged) 0.607** (0.225) 0.294 (0.342) 
Evangelical (lagged) -0.333* (0.155) -0.126 (0.256) 
Age (lagged) 0.827*** (0.245) -0.622* (0.368) 
Education (lagged) 0.495*** (0.149) -0.317* (0.191) 
South (lagged) -0.212* (0.096) -0.021 (0.126) 
Female (lagged) -0.055 (0.077) -0.029 (0.115) 
Income (lagged) 0.201 (0.170) -0.054 (0.392) 
Party  (lagged) 4.568*** (0.116) 5.601*** (0.155) 
Constant 0.091 (0.189) 0.661* (0.271) 
Adj. R2 0.636 
 
0.776 
 
N 1,028 
 
424 
 Sources: 1972-1976 & 2000-2004 American National Election Study Panel Surveys 
Note: Ordered probit in Models 1 and 2. OLS in Models 3 and 4. Party as dependent variable is 
on a seven-point scale. Church attendance as a dependent variable is on a five-point scale. Sample 
limited to Catholic and Protestant whites. All independent variables are on a 0-1 scale and lagged 
to either 1972 or 2000. *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 , one-tailed tests 
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sorting process. The interaction carries a negative sign, although it is not significant 
(coef. -0.368; s.e. 0.224).  
Strong Republican evangelicals have a 27.3% probability of attending weekly, 
which is indistinct from the 30.8% probability for strong Democratic evangelicals. Unlike 
in the 2000s, party did not influence church attendance of evangelicals in 1976. However, 
Catholic and non-evangelical Protestant strong Republicans in 1976 had a 30.1% chance 
of attending weekly while similar strong Democrats had a 21.9% chance. This 8% 
difference is significant statistically but minor substantively, indicating a comparatively 
weak political sorting in during the 1970s. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 reflect church attendance’s influence on party in 1976 
and 2004. As with the more fully elaborated model in Table 1, church attendance did not 
influence the 2004 party identification of either non-evangelical Christians or 
evangelicals. Similarly, the main estimate for attendance frequency was not significant in 
1976. In contrast, the positive and significant interaction (coef. 0.607; s.e. 0.225) supports 
the traditional notion of religion’s political influence as an “unmoved mover” by 
suggesting that high church attendance discouraged evangelicals from identifying with 
the Democratic party in the 1970s. This effect should not be overstated, though; a 
simulated evangelical who never attended church in 1972 had a predicted party 
identification in 1976 at 2.56, a statistically distinct value but with minor substantive 
difference from the 3.03 of her counterpart who attended weekly. Both those who 
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attended weekly and those who never attended would round to the category of 
Democratic leaning independents.
15
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay provides further evidence of and a theoretical explanation for a pattern 
first recognized by Hout and Fischer (2002) and Patrikios (2008). The political successes 
of the Christian right have had unintended consequences for churches. Through forceful 
engagement of the public sphere, evangelical religious elites placed a partisan filter in 
front of their sanctuary doors.
16
 Despite the importance of religion for political decision 
making among both citizens and elites, political preferences emerged to become a major 
factor causing both frequent and infrequent church attendance. Recognizing this 
interdependency between religion and politics strengthens understanding of their causal 
relationship, cautioning scholars to consider the validity of established findings about the 
                                                 
15
 Supporting Information E presents similar models using various years of data from the 
General Social Survey. In these models, party did not significantly influence 
evangelicals’ church attendance in 1976 but had dramatic effects in 2004, adding 
confidence to results in Table 4. 
16
 From the perspective of evangelical churches, the normative consequences of political 
sorting are mixed. While they have lost the active membership of many Democrats, they 
also have made gains among Republicans. Regardless, stereotypes of evangelical 
churches likely counteract efforts of individual leaders to shield their congregations from 
political change. 
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political effects of church attendance when those findings do not account for the 
endogenous nature of religious behavior. 
While the theory is tested among Christians in the United States, it could be 
adapted to other religions and countries if modified to account for different norms and 
religious freedoms. This paper’s investigation has been limited to religious behavior, but 
it suggests that future work should consider how political preferences may also influence 
religious belonging, belief, secularization, and extremism. Additionally, the theory of 
politically influenced organizational satisfaction could be extended to explain 
membership patterns in other voluntary associations. For example, members of politically 
active organizations like local chambers of commerce often join for non-political reasons, 
but their long term involvement may, in part, depend on politics. 
 Religious sorting is a process initiated by broader political sorting. A well-sorted 
political environment creates a context favorable for churches to homogenize along 
partisan lines. The loss of actively involved Democratic evangelicals eliminates a 
counterweight that may have restrained some evangelical leaders from taking 
increasingly conservative positions. Amplified messages promise to induce a backlash by 
threatened Democrats which may, in turn, threaten Republicans. Simultaneously, cross-
cutting information withers in an important social setting, encouraging both Democrats 
and Republicans to take more extreme positions. The resulting dynamic produces a 
feedback loop in which polarization emerges as a self-intensifying process. 
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Supporting Information A: Protestant Denomination Coding 
 
Coding of Protestant denominations is generally consistent with Layman and Green 
(2006).  
 
Evangelical Protestants 
Seventh-Day Adventist, American Baptist Association, Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist 
General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist 
Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, National 
Association of Free Will Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Reformed Baptist, Southern Baptist 
Convention, Mennonite Church, Evangelical Covenant Church, Evangelical Free Church, 
Congregational Christian, Brethren in Christ, Mennonite Brethren, Christian and 
Missionary Alliance, Church of God (Anderson, Ind.), Church of the Nazarene, Free 
Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Church of God of Findlay, Ohio, 
Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America, Lutheran 
Church–Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Congregational 
Methodist, Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, Tenn.), Church of God 
(Huntsville, Al.), International Church of the Four Square Gospel, Pentecostal Church of 
God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God 
of Prophecy, Apostolic Pentecostal, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian 
Church in America, Evangelical Presbyterian, Christian Reformed Church. 
 
Note: Several small denominations are not represented in the data or the codebook does 
not fully distinguish the small denomination from a larger denominational label. For 
example, the ANES does not have a special code for Church of God of Findlay. 
 
Non-Evangelical 
Other Protestant denominations and non-denominational Protestants are coded as non-
evangelical Protestant. Given the importance of not conflating political preferences with 
religious tradition for the purposes of this paper, I break with this coding scheme in the 
case of ambiguous Protestants, which I code as non-evangelical. Layman and Green 
(2006) details in Appendix A: “Non-black individuals who identified themselves as 
fundamentalist, evangelical, or charismatic/spirit-filled were coded as evangelical 
Protestants.” and “Non-black individuals who identified themselves as liberal were coded 
as mainline Protestants.” While some non-denominational churches should ideally be 
classified as evangelical, it is difficult to distinguish them from those that are not. Placing 
members of evangelical non-denominational churches in the reference category should 
only make results harder to find. 
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Supporting Information B: Catholic Interaction 
 
Table 1B: Church Attendance as a Function of Lagged Partisanship, 2000-2004 Panel 
 
Param. Est (Std. Error) 
Attendance00 3.151*** (0.214) 
Party00 0.128 (0.215) 
Evangelical00 -0.866** (0.298) 
Evangelical00 x Party00 1.438*** (0.431) 
Catholic00 -0.274 (0.203) 
Catholic00 x Party00 0.0446 (0.315) 
Prayer Frequency00 0.513* (0.224) 
Biblical Literalism00 -0.564** (0.206) 
Age 0.655* (0.356) 
Education00 0.168 (0.184) 
Female 0.0292 (0.106) 
South00 -0.213* (0.124) 
cut 1 0.575* (0.307) 
cut 2 1.313*** (0.309) 
cut 3 1.960*** (0.316) 
cut 4 2.890*** (0.330) 
cut 5 3.867*** (0.340) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.249  
N 464  
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. Ordered probit estimates. Dependent 
variable is 6-pt. church attendance in 2004. Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample 
limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
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Supporting Information C: Transformed Models (Church Attendance Change) 
 
Table 1C: Church Attendance as a Function of Lagged Partisanship, 2000-2004 Panel 
 
Param. Est (Std. Error) 
Party00 0.0296 (0.173) 
Evangelical00 -0.535* (0.297) 
Evangelical00 x Party00 0.940* (0.421) 
Prayer Frequency00 -0.455* (0.211) 
Biblical Literalism00 -0.379* (0.218) 
Age 0.174 (0.376) 
Education00 -0.103 (0.192) 
Female -0.0106 (0.114) 
South00 -0.261* (0.132) 
Constant 0.413 (0.304) 
Adjusted R
2
 464  
N 0.018  
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is 
change in church attendance from 2000 to 2004. 5 indicates maximum increase; -5 
indicates maximum decrease. Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample limited to 
Protestant and Catholic whites. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
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Supporting Information C: Transformed Models (Church Attendance Change) 
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Figure 1C: Predicted Change in Frequency of Church Attendance 
(2004 values minus 2000 values) 
Evangelical Protestants Catholics and Non-Evangelical Protestants
Predicted Values from an OLS model of change based on Table 1B model. Potential change ranges from 5 
(increase) to -5 (decrease). Results are for female non-southerners with other characteristics at their means. 
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Supporting Information C: Transformed Models (Church Attendance Change) 
 
Table 3C: Church Attendance as a Function of Partisanship Conditioned by Centrality Measures, 2000-2004 
Panel 
 Religious Centrality Political Centrality Religion vs. Politics 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Conditional: 
Religious 
Centrality 
High 
Religious 
Centrality 
Low 
Political 
Centrality 
High 
Political 
Centrality 
Low 
Politics 
Relatively 
High 
Politics 
Relatively 
Low 
 
Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party00 0.443 -0.119 0.0390 0.0340 -0.112 0.374 
 
(0.309) (0.211) (0.205) (0.300) (0.213) (0.305) 
Evangelical00 0.105 -0.946* -1.387*** 0.0164 -1.026** 0.384 
 
(0.420) (0.418) (0.416) (0.442) (0.384) (0.459) 
Evangelical00 x Party00 0.398 1.336** 2.348*** 0.184 1.823*** -0.437 
 
(0.650) (0.560) (0.644) (0.602) (0.582) (0.609) 
Prayer Frequency00 -0.0889 -0.634** -0.151 -0.649 -0.471* -0.530 
 
(0.345) (0.267) (0.258) (0.466) (0.258) (0.396) 
Biblical Literalism00 -0.356 -0.387 -0.308 -0.617* -0.292 -0.444 
 
(0.315) (0.295) (0.282) (0.348) (0.292) (0.318) 
Age 0.807 -0.115 0.603 -0.316 0.0310 0.558 
 
(0.611) (0.479) (0.463) (0.622) (0.480) (0.615) 
Education00 -0.145 -0.0849 -0.211 0.115 -0.0350 -0.182 
 
(0.307) (0.245) (0.230) (0.325) (0.247) (0.297) 
Female 0.0632 -0.00379 0.0335 0.00217 0.0420 -0.139 
 
(0.190) (0.144) (0.142) (0.187) (0.145) (0.191) 
South00 -0.371* -0.245 -0.106 -0.305 -0.266 -0.323 
 
(0.223) (0.165) (0.176) (0.200) (0.172) (0.206) 
Constant -0.524 0.798* 0.0690 0.700 0.436 0.275 
 
(0.500) (0.381) (0.363) (0.591) (0.390) (0.514) 
Adj. R2 0.024 0.022 0.045 -0.001 0.023 0.007 
N 151 313 252 212 317 147 
Source: National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is change in church 
attendance from 2000 to 2004. 5 indicates maximum increase; -5 indicates maximum decrease. 
Independent variables on 0-1 scale. Sample limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
  
44 
 
Supporting Information C: Transformed Models (Church Attendance Change) 
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Figure 2C: Religious Centrality and Predicted Change in Frequency of 
Church Attendance among Evangelicals 
(2004 values minus 2000 values) 
Low Religious Centrality High Religious Centrality
Predicted values from an OLS model of change based on Table 2B model. Potential change ranges from 5 (increase) 
to -5 (decrease). Results are for female non-southerners with other characteristics at their means. 
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Supporting Information D: Measuring Centrality 
 
The religious centrality index has two components. I place each component on 0-
1 scale, add them together, and divide by two. The resulting index weights components 
equally. Higher values equal greater centrality. This does not mean that people who score 
above 0.5 hold religion as central and those who score below do not. Rather, the mean 
religious centrality score is 0.67 with a standard deviation of 0.25. The first component 
comes from a question that asks how frequently a person reads the bible. This question 
asks, “Outside of attending religious services, do you read the Bible several times a day, 
once a day, a few times a week, once a week or less or never?” The Bible-reading 
question has several strengths. Bible reading is a widespread, discretionary religious 
behavior that does not require organized church involvement.  
The second religious centrality component measures how much guidance religion 
gives a person in his or her life.  It has two branches. The first stage reads, “Do you 
consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?” Interviews asked a second 
branch to those who answered yes. This branch read, “Would you say your religion 
provides some guidance in your day-to-day living?” 
The political centrality index combines two components: four questions on 
political issue importance and a question if a person sees a difference between the two 
parties. Each component received equal weight in the 0-1 index. The party differences 
component is from a question that asks, “Do you think there are any important 
differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?” The dichotomous variable 
has a mean of 0.70. The four issue importance questions tap importance of a range of 
issues reflecting a range of social and economic issues. These issues are jobs, taxes, the 
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environment, and abortion. Survey interviewers introduced each question with the lead 
up reading, “How important is this issue to you personally?” The taxes and jobs questions 
come from the 2002 survey because they were not in the 2000 questionnaire. However, 
these questions remain useful given that they remain lagged and lead to loss of few cases. 
The third index compares these two measures. I subtract the religious centrality 
measure from the political centrality and scale the resulting index on a 0 to 1 scale. The 
mean of this index is 0.618 with a standard deviation of 0.184. Values above 0.5 indicate 
that the political centrality index is higher than the religious centrality index for that 
individual. It is important to note that values above 0.5 do not mean politics is more 
important than religion for that person. Any given value on one index is not equal to the 
same value on the other index. The index is relative between individuals rather than 
within individuals. People above the sample mean on this scale evaluated politics as more 
important relative to religion relative to the rest of the sample. While an absolute index 
would be ideal, it is not practical with existing data and potentially theoretically 
implausible. However, this subtractive index is worthwhile in splitting samples. 
Both religious and political centrality measures use a combination of subjective 
and objective indicators. The religious objective measure is bible reading. The religious 
subjective measure is self-reported religious importance. The political objective measure 
is the party difference question. The political subjective measure is self-reported issue 
importance. Combining subjective and objective measures should lead to a better overall 
index.  
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Supporting Information E: General Social Survey Models 
 
Table 1E: Church Attendance Frequency at Different Times as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
Year: 1976 1991 & 1993 2004 
 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
 Param. Est. Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) (Std. Errors) 
Party -0.256 -0.034 0.293 
 
(0.256) (0.166) (0.178) 
Evangelical 0.381 -0.519* -0.810** 
 
(0.315) (0.247) (0.297) 
Party * Evangelical 0.191 0.909* 1.368** 
 
(0.631) (0.399) (0.440) 
Age 2.057*** 2.201*** 1.428*** 
 
(0.421) (0.300) (0.343) 
Female 0.511*** 0.534*** 0.693*** 
 
(0.148) (0.106) (0.114) 
Education 0.968** 1.178*** 0.959*** 
 
(0.309) (0.208) (0.211) 
Income 0.317 0.233 -0.056 
 
(0.582) (0.326) (0.266) 
Constant 2.718*** 2.483*** 2.761*** 
 
(0.283) (0.205) (0.219) 
Adj. R
2
 0.030 0.042 0.043 
N 1,236 2,417 1,966 
Source: General Social Survey. OLS estimates. Dependent variable is 9-pt. church attendance frequency. Independent 
variables on 0-1 scale. Sample limited to Protestants and Catholics.*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 -all one-tailed 
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Supporting Information E: General Social Survey Models 
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Diff: -0.07
n.s
1991 & 1993
Diff: 0.88
P < 0.05
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Diff: 1.66
P < 0.05
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Figure 1E: Evangelical Church Attendance by Party over Time 
Strong Democrats Strong Republicans
Source General Social Survey. Predicted values from models in Table 1E. Results are for 
female evangelicals with other characertics at their means.Church attendance is on  a 0-8 scale. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
How Politics Changes Churches 
 
Abstract: 
Scholars often treat churches as organizations exogenous to politics, assuming a 
unidirectional relationship between religion and political preferences. However, I argue 
that politics changes some American churches. Through analysis of a variety of surveys, I 
find that party has major effects on individual behavior within churches. Specifically, 
partisan conflict within evangelical Protestant churches creates an environment leading to 
partisan differences in religious experience. Evangelical Republicans are more likely than 
evangelical Democrats to report high satisfaction with church services and high levels of 
social integration. In turn, these Republicans are more likely than Democrats to invest 
time and money into their church and share their faith with others. The corresponding 
decline of actively involved Democrats in evangelical churches has the potential to 
exacerbate mass polarization. 
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Leaders of the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in 
the United States, gathered in 2011 to consider changing their name in hopes of 
addressing a long-term problem- membership steadily fell over the last four years and 
new baptisms reached a half-century low (Smietana 2012). Membership changes are 
particularly pronounced among some groups within the denomination. Between 1986 and 
2004, white strong Republicans tripled while white strong Democrats declined by half 
(General Social Survey 1972-2006). Southern Baptist churches are not unique in 
experiencing membership changes. American religion is fluid. Almost half of Americans 
change their religious affiliation in their lifetimes (Pew 2009), and nearly 80% vary their 
church attendance from childhood to adulthood (General Social Survey 1972-2006). 
Given the active political role of churches, these congregational dynamics are important. 
I argue that politics lies at the heart of membership changes within evangelical 
denominations. Many of these churches take provocative stances on political issues. And, 
the rising polarization of politics means people are likely to have strong feelings about 
these positions (Hetherington 2009). Democrats’ political preferences often clash with 
the dominant political direction of evangelical churches while evangelical Republicans 
are likely to experience an affirming political environment. Consequently, political 
predispositions may have a powerful influence on many Americans’ relationships with 
their churches. I present a theory of politicization of churches. Applying that theory to the 
contemporary United States explains how politics alters satisfaction with and social 
integration in churches, processes that, in turn, influence investment in churches. 
Democrats have sorted out of while Republicans have sorted into intense involvement in 
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evangelical churches. I test resulting expectations with a variety of surveys about 
organizational behavior in churches. 
 
A Generalized Theory of the Politicization of Churches 
 
The politicization of churches functions through two coinciding mechanisms: 
social and psychological. Political messages associated with a church can offer 
psychological comfort and distress while both forging and breaking social bonds. People 
increase their commitment when have ample friends in a church or enjoy being involved 
with the organization. In contrast, people leave an organization, neglect it, or attempt to 
change it when they are dissatisfied (Hirschman 1970; Withey and Cooper 1989). 
The process of compromised satisfaction begins when a churchgoer receives a 
political message that signals the prevailing political preferences of the organization. 
Political preferences become associated with churches in several ways. First, clergy 
communicate political messages. Though the extent to which politics is mentioned from 
the pulpit varies, sermons often address controversial political issues (Brewer et al 2003). 
Second, fellow church members often discuss politics in church (Djupe and Gilbert 
2009). These discussions can center directly on a political topic or they can reveal 
political preferences as part of a broader discussion of values (Walsh 2004). Third, the 
social environment external to a church informs churchgoers of politics internal to that 
church. The media craft narratives depicting certain churches as favoring clear political 
positions, allowing even those who have never personally participated in a group’s 
services to view that group as having distinct political preferences. 
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When political information transmitted through these sources is inconsistent with 
a churchgoer’s preexisting political preferences, the ensuing conflict can cause 
dissonance (Festinger 1957). By lowering evaluation of the church, the churchgoer is able 
to resolve dissonance and reconcile conflicting information that might otherwise make it 
difficult for that person to maintain a sense of self that is competent and moral. On the 
other hand, many political messages associated with a church are consistent with a 
person’s prior preferences. Encountering a message that sustains one’s political beliefs 
promotes a stable understanding of the world (Jost et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2008), allowing 
politics to enhance organizational satisfaction. 
Additionally, politics can alter the social fabric of a church. Churches have 
historically served as community centers where relationships form and friendships 
develop. These strong social ties encourage members to participate in their churches 
(Kuipers 2009; O’Reilly et al. 1989), fostering the development of civic resources and 
social capital (Putnam 2001; Brown and Brown 2003). However, political preferences 
should have major influence on social integration within churches. Fellow church 
members frequently communicate their own political preferences in church (Djupe and 
Gilbert 2009). When members agree about politics, such conversations can reinforce the 
security of existing beliefs, promote mutual appreciation, and enhance satisfaction (Mutz 
2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Conversely, when members disagree about 
emotional issues, political discussion in churches can be unpleasant, fostering discontent 
and social atrophy (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Jehn 1995). 
Similarly, political disagreement may lead to political minorities feeling criticized 
by fellow church members, especially if political preferences are associated with lifestyle 
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preferences. Political minorities can disturb the consistency of preferences within a 
church. Fellow members may view this consistency as a positive feature of their church 
that distinguishes it from competing social organizations. If so, political minorities in a 
church may find themselves as “black sheep” faced with scrutiny (Hornsey et al 2004; 
Abrams et al 2000; Khan and Lambert 1998; Marques et al. 1988). 
Political agreement may also have indirect influence on how deeply connected a 
person is with other members of his or her congregation. Homophily, the tendency of 
people to associate with others similar to themselves, is well-recognized as present within 
social organizations like churches (McPherson 2001). In a well-sorted society, politics is 
a criterion in which people make associative choices (Alford et. al 2011; Gentzkow and 
Shapiro 2011). Similarly, political preferences are correlated with consumer preferences 
and other non-political behavior, suggesting that those who disagree about politics may 
also disagree on other topics important for social integration (Hillygus and Shields 2008). 
Consequently, those with political preferences consistent with their congregation should 
find ample opportunities to become involved with other church members while those 
with inconsistent political preferences may find it difficult to build relationships within 
their church. 
Politics within churches has the potential to enhance or to reduce both social 
integration and the experience of attending church, leading to changes in organizational 
satisfaction with a church. Individuals respond to increasing organizational satisfaction 
by loyally increasing investments in that organization. Conversely, individuals should 
respond to decreasing organizational satisfaction with exit, voice, or neglect (Hirschman 
1970; Rusbult et al. 1988; Withey and Cooper 1989). Exit involves leaving the church 
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altogether, potentially joining another church or dropping out entirely. Voice involves 
attempts to amend the aspect of the organization that causes dissatisfaction. Neglect 
involves reduced participation and diminished organizational investment. Diminished 
organizational investment in churches can take the form of reduced donations of time and 
money and constrained efforts at sharing one’s faith. 
 
The Politicization of Churches in the Contemporary United States 
 
 For political messages to cause upheaval in churches, the informational 
environment within churches should have three characteristics: ubiquity, potency, and 
lack of ambiguity. By ubiquity, I mean that politics must be common enough to prevent a 
member from overlooking its presence. By potency, I mean the issue must be, as Layman 
(2001) describes “broad and deep” with the “capacity to provoke resistance.” By lack of 
ambiguity, I mean that information associated with a churches supports a single party 
platforms, giving the information the ability to reinforce existing cleavages. If such 
characteristics help an issue change the party system, they also aid in disrupting behavior 
within private social organizations. 
In the contemporary United States, these three requirements are most often met in 
evangelical Protestant churches.
17
 The overwhelming majority of evangelical churches 
are associated with the Republican Party on both social and economic issues, providing 
                                                 
17
 Evangelical churches are Protestant and “have typically sought more separation from 
the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught 
strict adherence to particular religious doctrines (Steensland et al 2000:294).” 
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clarity. Messages from evangelical leaders, the external informational environment, and 
church members ensure ubiquity (Hunter 1991; Hunter 2010).
18
 Strong stances on hot 
button conflicts like abortion and gay marriage offer a guarantee for potency that is only 
strengthened by a well-sorted political system (Hetherington 2009).
19
 
Mainline Protestant and Catholic churches, on the other hand, fail to consistently 
transmit such potent, ubiquitous, and non-ambiguous political messages. Non-evangelical 
churches often favor one party on certain issues and another party on other issues, 
eliminating clarity in the direction of politics (Putnam and Campbell 2010). While some 
political messages are present in non-evangelical churches, they are far less ubiquitous. 
Similarly, many non-evangelical clergy discuss politics less overtly (Neiheisel and Djupe 
2008; Olson and Cadge 2002). Messages in non-evangelical churches may lack potency 
if those churches concentrate on issues such as poverty and those issues lack the capacity 
to provoke response. Similarly, I expect the partisan sorting process to apply only in 
evangelical churches with predominately white membership. Though African American 
churches are of great political and social importance, the ambiguity of political messages 
within them complicates. Leaders of many African American churches take conservative 
                                                 
18
 Environmental heuristics have been clear about evangelicals for some time; more than 
twice as many people could not offer an opinion about the general favorability of 
Lutherans or Presbyterians than those who had no such opinion about Baptists (Barna 
1991). 
19
 Furthermore, evangelicals are more likely to embrace a culture of modifying religious 
behavior to meet personal preferences as shown by a tendency to "church shop” (Sherkat 
2001; Smith and Sikkink 2003). 
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positions on certain social issues such as gay marriage (Sherkat et al. 2010) but favor 
candidates and economic policies from the Democratic Party (Brown 2009). 
Although white Republican evangelicals should become more attached to their 
churches while white Democratic evangelicals become less attached, this theory does not 
suggest a general rule of religion sorting to the right. Because political preferences 
associated with churches are vary across context, involvement could decline among 
members of conservative parties in scenarios such as the social gospel movement in the 
progressive era. Though rare, the occasional liberal Catholic parish or mainline Protestant 
congregation may be sufficiently blatant in its political leanings to induce change.
20
 
Furthermore, the effects of political preferences on religious behavior were muted in the 
1970s when party divisions were less contentious (Husser n.d.). 
This essay joins only a few studies investigating political influence on religion 
(Campbell et al. 2011; Hout and Fischer 2002; Patrikios 2008). While I argue that politics 
has major effects among many people, considerable research finds several sets of 
additional explanations for religious dependent variables. The first set is that childhood 
familial socialization explains adult religious belonging and behavior (Bader and 
Desmond 2006; Bao et al. 1999; Dudley and Laurent 1989; Ellison and Sherkat 1990; 
Hunsberger 1984; Nelsen 1981; Ozorak 1989). The second set argues that the context of 
a person’s religious experience is important and emphasizes church characteristics and 
religious market forces (Chaves 2006; Dyck and Starke 1999; Iannacconne 1994; Kelley 
1977; Stern 1999). Finally, studies within the third set of explanations find that that 
                                                 
20
 However, the effects of party among members of these churches are difficult to detect 
because available data group these congregations into their larger religious tradition. 
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demographic variables such as sex, income, and region (Alston 1979; Batson et al. 1993; 
Hunt and Hunt 2000; Kalmijin 1998; Krause 2003; Shibley 1996).  
 
Expectations and Research Design 
 
The following analysis examines four testable expectations. The first two 
expectations focus on individual consequences by addressing social integration and 
satisfaction. Evangelical Protestant Republicans will be more likely than evangelical 
Protestant Democrats to be satisfied with and socially integrated in their church. The 
second two expectations focus on organizational consequences by addressing behavior 
relevant to church growth and investment. Evangelical Protestant Republicans will be 
more likely than evangelical Protestant Democrats to invest in their church and to share 
their religion with others. 
I use eleven dependent variables from surveys by three organizations to address 
these expectations. The General Social Survey includes questions about church 
satisfaction and feeling criticized by fellow church members. The Baylor Religion 
Survey, conducted in 2005 and 2007 features questions related to donating money to 
churches, social integration and volunteering in churches, and witnessing to strangers. 
Finally, the Portraits of American Life Survey provides data on feeling appreciated in a 
church and letting others know about one’s religion. Independent variables of primary 
interest are consistent across all models. These variables are party identification, a 
variable indicating if the respondent is a member of an evangelical Protestant 
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denomination, and their multiplicative interaction term.
21
 The interaction reflects the 
conditional effect of party among evangelicals (Kam and Franzese 2007). All 
independent variables are on a 0-1 scale to ease interpretation. 
Members of evangelical Protestant churches and political messages associated 
with those churches typically favor the Republican Party. Consequently, models operate 
under the assumption that Democratic evangelicals have political preferences that are 
inconsistent with their church while Republican evangelicals have political preferences 
that are consistent with their church.
 
This assumption will be violated by members of 
liberal evangelical churches (Olson 2011). Such rare violations will only reduce the 
magnitude of estimates without increasing the likelihood of rejecting a true null 
hypothesis. 
I exclude non-Protestants and non-Catholics for three reasons. First, power is 
inadequate for almost every group that is not Protestant or Catholic. Second, Catholics 
and Protestants, arguably, have the most political influence in the United States and are of 
special interest to social science as a result. Third, limiting the sample facilitates intuitive 
comparisons of evangelicals with Catholics and non-evangelical Protestants in the 
reference category. Additionally, I restrict the sample to whites. Given that churches tend 
to be racially homogenous (Dougherty 2003), churches of evangelical Protestant 
minorities are unlikely to transmit Republican messages.  
Unfortunately, panel survey data are not available for these dependent variables, 
eliminating a useful technique to address endogeneity.
22
 Party identification is at least as 
                                                 
21
Supporting Information detail the coding of religious tradition and other variables, 
respectively. 
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stable as religious behavior.
23
 Long-term partisan preferences are more difficult to 
identify and associate with unpleasant feelings than a conflicting political message 
coming from a church, a concrete source at a specific time. For many Americans, 
religious change should be easier than political change. Changing partisanship requires a 
fundamental change in beliefs while changing religious expression only requires a change 
in organizational commitment. Neglect of a church is a compromise that aids in resolving 
dissatisfaction while retaining political and religious connections. 
 
Politics of Organizational Satisfaction with Churches 
 
Preaching and worship services are central to many people’s relationship with 
their church. Consequently, one’s evaluations of preaching and worship are reflective of 
his or her overall church evaluation. I turn to two questions about church evaluation from 
the 2000 cross-sectional General Social Survey. The first question asks “Would you say 
your local church does an excellent, very good, fair, or poor job of preaching?” The 
second question asks “Would you say your local church does an excellent, very good, 
fair, or poor job of worship services?” Both questions are on a five-point scale that ranges 
from least supportive, “poor,” to most supportive, “excellent.” Mean responses are high 
                                                                                                                                                 
22
 See Husser (n.d.) and Patrikios (2008) for panel data analysis of party and church 
attendance. 
23
In the American National Election Study 2000-20004 Panel Survey, the correlation 
between 2000 and 2004 measures is 0.8494 for party and 0.7899 for church attendance 
frequence, a significant difference (p <.001) based on Fisher’s-z transformation.  
60 
 
(3.82 for preaching and 3.95 for worship services) and over 90% of cases fall into the top 
three categories. 
I employ the questions in two ordered probit models appearing in Table 1. 
Preaching evaluation is the dependent variable in Model 1, and worship service 
evaluation is the dependent variable in Model 2. Party identification with seven-values 
ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican), an evangelical Protestant 
dummy, and their multiplicative interaction term are independent variables of interest. 
Several other variables are included to better account for the relationship between church 
evaluation and partisanship. Prayer frequency controls for spirituality. I include age 
because older people are politically distinct and potentially more sensitive to church 
relationships (Krause 2003). Similarly, gender, education, and income have both political 
and religious consequences. 
The main effect of party has a small and statistically insignificant coefficient in 
each model (Model 1 coef.: 0.0250; s.e.: 0.159; Model 2 coef.: -0.0752; s.e.: 0.160). In 
both models, non-evangelical strong Democrats and strong Republicans evaluate their 
churches very similarly. The evangelical dummy variable is also insignificant for 
preaching evaluation (coef.: -0.293; s.e.: 0.242) and worship service evaluation (coef.: -
0.103; s.e.: 0.245); simply being an evangelical Protestant does not influence church 
evaluation when the value of party is zero. However, the interaction between evangelical 
and party is significant in both the model of preaching evaluation (coef.: 1.097; s.e.: 
0.359) and the model of worship service evaluation (coef.: 0.623; s.e.: 0.358). Party has 
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major substantive effects on evangelical Protestants’ church evaluations.24 Strong 
Democratic evangelicals have a 17% and a 26% predicted probability of evaluating 
preaching and worship services as excellent, respectively. These probabilities rise 
dramatically to 57% and 46%, respectively, for strong Republicans. These differences are 
roughly equivalent to the effect of prayer frequency, a factor of facially valid relevance.
25
 
Results about church evaluation aid in a broader project of causal inference. 
Political preferences have a strong relationship with the evangelicals’ church evaluations. 
Evangelicals who identify more closely with the Democratic Party tend to evaluate their 
church less favorably. An alternative argument is that those who favor their church’s 
services are likely to integrate that church’s political positions into their political identity. 
This alternative requires an improbably robust expectation of the impact of church 
evaluation to drive the bulk of party identification, a stable psychological attachment. 
More likely, the dominant driver of the relationship between church evaluation and 
partisanship is political rather than religious. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 All predicted values and probabilities in this essay were calculated in Stata using Long 
and Freese’s (2006) Spost program. Dichotomous independent variables are set at their 
modes and non-dichotomous variables are set at their means. 
25
Party is unlikely acting as a proxy for spirituality. The prayer frequency of white 
evangelical Republicans and Republican-leaning independents is indistinguishable (p = 
0.68) from that of white evangelical Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents 
(American National Election Study 2000-2004 Panel). 
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Table 1: Church Evaluation as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 Preaching Evaluation Worship Service Evaluation 
 Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party 0.0250 -0.0752 
 
(0.159) (0.160) 
Evangelical -0.293 -0.103 
 
(0.242) (0.245) 
Party * Evangelical 1.097** 0.623* 
 
(0.359) (0.358) 
Age -0.0823 -0.641* 
 
(0.276) (0.279) 
Female 0.0392 -0.0110 
 (0.0956) (0.0964) 
Education 0.180 0.0580 
 (0.179) (0.181) 
Income -0.217 0.102 
 
(0.215) (0.217) 
South -0.0360 0.102 
 (0.105) (0.105) 
Prayer Frequency 0.622** 0.866*** 
 (0.206) (0.207) 
Biblical Literalism 0.555*** 0.621*** 
 (0.179) (0.180) 
Cut 1 -1.287*** -1.541*** 
 
(0.260) (0.272) 
Cut 2 -0.594** -0.800*** 
 
(0.238) (0.239) 
Cut 3 0.578** 0.399* 
 
(0.232) (0.233) 
Cut 4 1.492*** 1.345*** 
 
(0.238) (0.238) 
Observations 540 542 
Pseudo R
2
 0.041 0.043 
Source: General Social Survey, 2000. 
DV: Evaluation of how well local church conducts preaching and worship. 5pt (1- Poor; 5 – 
Excellent) Ordered Probit. Sample limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. Independent 
variables range from 0 to 1. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 - all one-tailed. 
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The Polarization of Friends in Church 
 
The Portraits of American Life Survey asked respondents to name two people 
who they were particularly close to who also attended their church. Overall, 81% of white 
evangelical Protestants were able to name two people close to them in their church. 
However, only 64% of while Democratic evangelicals could name two people, 14% less 
than white Republican evangelicals (t = 2.608). I turn to the 2005 Baylor Religion Survey 
to provide a multivariate test of this partisan friendship gap. Table 2 reports estimates 
from an ordered probit model of friends in church. The dependent variable question asked 
“How many of your friends attend your place of worship?” The five response options 
ranged from (1) none to (5) almost all. As in prior models, the independent variables of 
central concern are party, the evangelical dummy, and their multiplicative interaction 
term. Age, female, education, residency in the South, income, biblical literalism, and 
prayer frequency are controls.  
The main effect of party is insignificant (coef. -0.0193; std. error 0.161) reflecting 
party’s lack of effect on friendship patterns in Catholic and non-evangelical Protestant 
churches. However, the interaction term is significant in the expected direction (coef. 
0.699; std. error (0.262). Party has a major effect on friendship patterns in evangelical 
churches. A strong Republican evangelical has a 15.4% predicted probability of having 
most of her friends in her church, three times the 4.8% predicted probability for strong 
Democratic evangelicals. Similarly, strong Republican evangelicals have a 13.1% chance 
of having none of their friends in their church, significant less than the 32.9% probability 
for strong Democratic evangelicals. Overall, the effect of party among evangelical 
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friendship patterns is equivalent to the difference between an 18 year old and a 65 year 
old and about three times the magnitude of the South dummy.
26
 
 
Table 2: Friends in Church as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
 Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Party -0.0193 (0.161) 
Evangelical -0.624*** (0.187) 
Party * Evangelical 0.699** (0.262) 
Age 1.695*** (0.252) 
Female 0.0345 (0.0826) 
Education 0.123 (0.184) 
South 0.218** (0.0856) 
Income -0.487** (0.178) 
Biblical Literalism 0.659*** (0.140) 
Prayer Frequency 0.168 (0.148) 
Cut 1 0.191 (0.250) 
Cut 2 1.759*** (0.257) 
Cut 3 2.273*** (0.260) 
Cut 4 3.507*** (0.278) 
Observations 795 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 
 Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2005. 
Ordered Probit; Sample limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. Independent variables 
range from 0 to 1. DV: How many of your friends attend your place of worship? 5pt: (1- 
none; 5- all) 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001-all one-tailed 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 See Supporting Information for analysis suggesting these findings are unlikely to be a 
product of Republicans having more concentrated friends in organizations in general. 
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Politicized Appreciation and Criticism in Churches 
 
In general, it is rare for a person to feel criticized by members of his or her 
church. The 1998 General Social Survey included a question that read, “How often are 
the people in your congregation critical of you and the things you do?” Three-fourths of 
respondents said they never felt criticized. However, a simple comparison of means 
shows Democratic evangelicals reporting criticism almost twice as frequently as 
Republican evangelicals (31% vs. 17%; p <.05). Model 1 in Table 3 is a logistic 
regression using this criticism question as its dependent variable (0 – criticism; 1 – no 
criticism). Once again, variables of interest are party, the evangelical dummy, and their 
interaction. Covariates include education, age, sex, and residency in the South. As 
expected, party is insignificant in Model 1 (coef.: -0.206; s.e.: .349) while the estimate for 
interaction of party and the evangelical dummy is significant (coef.: 1.767; s.e.: 0.735). A 
strong Republican evangelical has a 10.9% predicted probability of feeling criticized, less 
than one-third of the 36.9% probability of strong Democrats. This statistically difference 
is equivalent to a 70 year increase in age. 
In addition to criticism, feelings of appreciation are indicative of member’s 
cohesiveness in a group. The dependent variable in Model 2 of Table 3 was asked of the 
respondents in the Portraits of American Life Survey who said they volunteered in their 
church at least one hour each month and read, “How often do you feel you are 
appreciated by the leaders or people of your congregation for the work and activities that 
you do at your congregation?” Model 2’s right-hand side is identical to that of Model 1. 
Paralleling its relationships with criticism, the main effect of party is insignificant for   
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Table 3: Criticism and Appreciation in Church as a Function of Party 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Feeling Criticized Feeling Appreciated 
 Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party -0.206 -0.0148 
 (0.349) (0.226) 
Evangelical -0.833* -0.347 
 
(0.460) (0.251) 
Party * Evangelical 1.767** 0.712* 
 
(0.735) (0.357) 
Education 0.0631 0.251 
 
(0.336) (0.228) 
Female 0.0614 0.102 
 (0.203) (0.131) 
Age 2.028*** 0.789* 
 (0.598) (0.375) 
South -0.0914 0.0130 
 (0.211) (0.134) 
Constant /Cut 1 0.315 -1.012*** 
 (0.397) (0.304) 
Cut 2 - -0.118 
 - (0.296) 
Cut 3 - 0.619* 
 - (0.298) 
Cut 4 - 1.147*** 
  (0.300) 
Observations 597 291 
Pseudo R
2
 0.027 0.015 
Model 1: General Social Survey, 1998. 
DV: How often R feel criticized by church members. 
2pt: 0- very often,  fairly often, or once in a while, 1- never. 
Model 2: Source: Portraits of American Life Survey, 2006.  
DV: How often do you feel you are appreciated by the leaders or people of your 
congregation for the work and activities that you do at your congregation? 
5pt: (1 - Not at all; 5 - All the time) 
Logit in Model 1. Ordered Probit in Model 2. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. 
Samples limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. Model 2 sample also limited to church 
volunteers. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 -all one-tailed 
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feeling appreciated (coef.: 0.0148; s.e.: 0.226), but the multiplicative interaction term is 
significant (coef.: 0.712; s.e.: 0.357). Strong Democratic evangelical Protestants’ 
probability of always feeling appreciated is 19.2%, less than half of similar strong 
Republicans’ 43.1% probability. This difference is twice that between an 18 year old and 
a 65 year old. 
 
The Politics of Investment in Churches 
 
Compromised satisfaction and social integration should induce a process of 
neglect. Symptomatic of neglect is an unwillingness to invest many personal resources 
into one’s church through donations of money or through volunteering. Table 4 presents 
multivariate tests of the effect of party on church donations of time and money. The 
dependent variable in Model 1 is a respondent’s annual monetary donations to a church 
reflected by 12 categories ranging from donations under $500 to more than $10,000. The 
five-category dependent variable in Model 2 is the number of hours a respondent 
volunteers his or her church in a typical month.
27
 Right-hand side variables are identical 
in both models. As in prior models, the independent variables of central concern are 
party, the evangelical dummy, and their interaction. Gender, education, age, income, 
residency in the South, pray frequency, and biblical literalism are present as covariates. 
Model 1 is based on a question from the 2007 wave of the Baylor Religion Survey while 
Model 2 is based on a question from the 2005 wave. 
                                                 
27
 Self-reports of religious behavior are prone to measurement error (Hadaway et al 1998; 
Sherkat 2007), but I have no expectation that such error is correlated with party. 
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OLS estimates from Model 1 show that party is important for monetary church 
donations of evangelical Protestants, but not for non-evangelical Protestants and 
Catholics in the reference category. Though the main effect of party is insignificant 
(coef.: 0.226; s.e. 0.376)., the interaction between party and the evangelical dummy 
variable is significant in the expected direction (coef.: 2.155; s.e. 0.630). The maximum 
effect of party among evangelicals’ church donation is 2.38 units on the 12-point scale an 
effect equivalent to the difference in monetary donations between a person from a 
household earning $10,000 to $20,000 and another from a household with $150,000 or 
more in annual income.  
Party’s effect on donations of time to churches is consistent with its effect on 
donations of money. The main effect of party is not significant in the ordered probit 
estimates of Model 2 (coef.: -0.0783; s.e. 0.137). However, the interaction is significant 
(coef.: 0.442; s.e. 0.261). Evangelical strong Republican have a 24% combined predicted 
probability of volunteering 3-4 hours, 5-10 hours, or 11 or more hours each month, 
almost twice the 14% probability of strong Democrats to volunteer at one of these three 
levels. The substantive effect of party for evangelicals is almost identical to that  of 
education, a factor well-recognized as promoting volunteering (McPherson and Rotolo 
1996; Brady et al 1999; Wilson 2000). 
  
69 
 
Table 4: Church Donations and Volunteering as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Donations Volunteering 
 Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party 0.226 -0.0783 
 (0.376) (0.137) 
Evangelical -0.420 -0.167 
 (0.449) (0.194) 
Party * Evangelical 2.155*** 0.442* 
 (0.630) (0.261) 
Female -0.244 0.00346 
 (0.189) (0.0807) 
Education 1.411*** 0.378* 
 (0.424) (0.189) 
Age 1.432** 0.0649 
 (0.597) (0.257) 
Income 2.771*** 0.184 
 (0.405) (0.175) 
South 0.259 -0.0197 
 (0.198) (0.0866) 
Prayer Frequency 1.787*** 1.122*** 
 (0.348) (0.145) 
Biblical Literalism 1.159*** 0.137*** 
 (0.318) (0.0349) 
Constant/ Cut 1 -2.833*** 1.925*** 
 (0.592) (0.279) 
Cut 2  2.517*** 
  (0.282) 
Cut 3  2.999*** 
  (0.285) 
Cut 4  3.637*** 
  (0.293) 
Observations 703 1,022 
Adj. / Pseudo R
2
 0.2526 0.061 
Model 1: Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2006. Wave 2, 2007.  
DV: During the last year, approximately how much money did you and other family members 
in your household contribute to your current place of worship? 
12pt: 1- Under $500; 12- $10,00 or more 
Model 2: Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2005.  
DV: On average about how many hours per month do you volunteer in your church 
5pt: 1: None, 5: 11+ hours. 
OLS in Model 1. Ordered Probit in Model 2. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. 
Samples limited to Protestant and Catholic whites. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 -all one-
tailed 
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The Politics of Transmitting One’s Faith 
 
The alignment of political preference with one’s church should also motivate a 
person to share his or her faith with others. Transmission of belief is deeply embedded in 
many religions. However, proselytizing is costly as sharing one’s religion could lead to 
social scorn. People at odds with the politics in their church should feel less desire to bear 
these costs and subsequently be less likely to encourage others to adopt their religion. 
The analysis below considers two forms of religious transmission. The first form is 
sharing one’s faith with others. The second form is intergenerational transmission. 
 
The Polarization of Proselytizing  
 
Table 5 present estimates from ordered probit models of two dependent variables 
related to sharing the faith. The dependent variable in Model 1 is based on a five-category 
question in the 2007 Baylor Religion survey that reads, “How often did you participate in 
the following religious or faith-based activities in the last month? Witnessing/sharing 
your faith with strangers.” The dependent variable in Model 2 is based on a three-point 
question in the Portraits of American Life Survey that reads “How do you feel about 
letting others outside of your closer friends and family know that you are a member of the 
religion you stated earlier?” Taken together the questions capture both active efforts and 
passive behavior to share one’s faith. Again, the independent variables of central concern 
are party, the evangelical dummy, and their interaction. Control variables are age sex, 
education, residency in the South, and income. 
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Table 5: Sharing Religion as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Witnessing to Strangers Tell About Religion 
 
Param. Est. Param. Est. 
 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party -0.147 0.586*** 
 (0.206) (0.173) 
Evangelical 0.263 0.584*** 
 (0.212) (0.172) 
Party * Evangelical 0.554* 0.444* 
 (0.307) (0.258) 
Age 0.470 1.290*** 
 (0.288) (0.278) 
Female 0.212* 0.214* 
 (0.0954) (0.0947) 
Education -0.679*** -0.0813 
 (0.216) (0.184) 
South 0.177* 0.0585 
 (0.0979) (0.0985) 
Income -0.519** -0.0960 
 (0.200) (0.213) 
Cut 1 0.553* 1.520*** 
 (0.276) (0.232) 
Cut 2 1.509*** 1.864*** 
 (0.281) (0.234) 
Cut 3 1.930*** - 
 (0.287) - 
Observations 856 764 
Pseudo R-squared 0.076 0.102 
Model 1: Source - Baylor Religion Survey, 2007. 
DV: How often did you participate in the following religious or faith-based activities 
in the last month? Witnessing/sharing your faith with strangers;  
4pt: 1 –Not at all; 4 – Five or more times INTERVAL 
Model 2: Source – Portraits of American Life Survey, 2006.  
DV: How do you feel about letting others outside of your closer friends and family 
know that you are a member of the religion you stated earlier? 
3pt: 1 - Don't care if people know or not; 3 - Definitely want people to know 
Ordered Probit regression; Samples limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 
to 1. 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001-all one-tailed 
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The main effect of party on witnessing to strangers is insignificant in Model 1 
(coef.: -0.147; std. error: 0.206), but the interaction is statistically and substantively 
significant (coef.: 0.554; std. error: 0.307). A strong Republican evangelical has a 43.6% 
predicted probability of witnessing to strangers at least once per month, significantly 
more than the 28.5% probability of a strong Democrat. This maximum difference in 
extreme partisans is not significant for non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics. 
Consistent with observations by Shibley (1996), Southerners are more likely than non-
Southerners to witness to strangers (coef.: 0.177; std. error: 0.0979). However, the effect 
of party among evangelicals on witnessing is over twice the magnitude of residency in 
the South. 
As shown in Model 2, Republicans are generally more comfortable letting others 
outside of their close and friends and family know their religion. Unlike its value in other 
models, the main effect of party is significant (coef.: 0.586; std. error: 0.173). Consistent 
with prior estimates, the effect of party is conditional on being an evangelical Protestant 
(coef.: 0.444; std. error: 0.258). An evangelical strong Democrat has a 31% probability of 
definitely wanting others to know about his or her religion, less than half of the 
statistically distinct 69% probability for evangelical strong Republicans. Party has a less 
extreme but still significant effect among non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics with 
strong Republicans having a 29% predicted probability of definitely wanting others to 
know about their religion, 14 points higher than their Democratic counterparts. 
Consistent with their definition, evangelicals are more likely than Catholics and non-
evangelical Protestants to desire others to know about their religion (coef.: 0.584; std. 
error: 0.172). However, the effect of party is greater than that of being an evangelical. 
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Politicized Transmission of Religion from Parent to Child 
 
Parents play a tremendous role in encouraging children to be like them along 
several dimensions – political (Jennings and Niemi 1968), educational (Trusty and Pirtle 
1998), economic (Mulligan 2007), and religious (Bader and Desmond 2006). Parental 
socialization, rather than politics, has long been recognized as a primary factor 
influencing religious belonging, behaving, and believing. However, parental transmission 
of religion is conditioned by a variety of factors (Bader and Desmond 2006). Parents 
whose satisfaction with their church is compromised by politics should place less 
emphasis on their children adopting their religion. This emphasis takes the direct form of 
desiring a child to have the same religion and the indirect form of desiring a child’s 
spouse to have the same religion. 
The Baylor Religion Survey asked two similar questions about intentions of 
intergenerational transmission. Both began by asking, “How important are the following 
things to you?” One question completed the prompt with, “That your children have the 
same religion as you?” The other finished, “That your children marry someone with the 
same religion as you?” Sixty percent of white Christians responded that it was very 
important or somewhat important for their children (actual or hypothetical) to share their 
religion while 48% of these respondents placed similar importance on the religion of their 
children’s spouses. However, Democrats were much less likely to emphasize 
transmission. Two-thirds of white Christian Democrats said it was not very important or 
not at all important for the child to have the same religion as them, right at twice the 
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percentage of Republicans indicting the same. This partisan difference is consistent with 
estimates from ordered probit models appearing in Table 6.  
 The dependent variables in Table 6 are importance of children or children’s 
spouse sharing the religion of the respondent. Model 1 reflects importance for the 
respondent’s children. Model 2 is importance for respondent’s children’s spouse. Both 
dependent variables are measured with five-categories that are ordered from not-
important (1) to very important (5). Again, the independent variables of central concern 
are party, evangelical, and their interaction. Control variables include age, sex, education, 
income, residency in the South, prayer frequency, and biblical literalism.  
 Among Catholics, evangelical Protestants, and mainline Protestants in the sample, 
Republicans are more likely to value their children sharing their religion. The main effect 
of party is significant in both Model 1 (coef.: 0.460; s.e.: 0.146) and in Model 2 (coef.: 
0.477; s.e.: 0.146). Party has even greater effects among evangelicals, as shown by the 
positive and significant interaction in Model 1 (coef.: 0.467; s.e.: 0.241) and in Model 2 
(coef.: 0.881; s.e.: 0.241). A strong Democrat evangelical has a 12% probability of 
thinking it is very important for their child to share their religion, less than one-third of 
the 40% probability of a strong Republican to think the same. This partisan gap in “very 
important” responses is still statistically distinct among non-evangelical Protestants and 
Catholics, but at 13.6% it is just under than half the difference between strong partisan 
evangelicals.  
The effect of party on importance of a child’s spouse sharing the respondent 
religion is similar. Non-evangelical Protestant and Catholic strong Republicans have a 
15.4% probability of answering very important, twice the 6.7% probability for strong 
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Table 6: Intergenerational Religious Transmission as Function of Party and Other Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Child Child's Spouse 
 
Param. Est Param. Est 
 
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Party 0.460*** 0.477*** 
 
(0.146) (0.146) 
Evangelical -0.179 -0.254 
 
(0.163) (0.163) 
Party * Evangelical 0.467* 0.881*** 
 
(0.241) (0.241) 
Age -1.048*** -0.468* 
 
(0.240) (0.237) 
Female -0.0471 -0.0523 
 
(0.0762) (0.0758) 
Education 0.323* 0.425** 
 
(0.169) (0.170) 
South -0.0951 0.0008 
 
(0.0808) (0.0801) 
Income 0.0567 -0.204 
 
(0.165) (0.164) 
Biblical Literalism 1.234*** 1.028*** 
 
(0.123) (0.122) 
Prayer Frequency 0.867*** 1.047*** 
 
(0.129) (0.129) 
Cut 1 -0.114 0.427* 
 
(0.226) (0.225) 
Cut 2 0.729*** 1.440*** 
 
(0.227) (0.227) 
Cut 3 0.917*** 1.631*** 
 
(0.227) (0.228) 
Cut 4 1.962*** 2.669*** 
 (0.233) (0.237) 
Observations 936 933 
Pseudo R-squared 0.128 0.144 
Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2007. 
DV: How important are the following things to you? That your [children/children’s spouse] 
have the same religion as you.  5pt - (0 - Not important; 5 - Very Important). 
Ordered Probit regression; Sample limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001-all one-tailed 
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Democrats. Evangelical Protestant strong Republicans have a 34.7% probability of 
answering very important, over eight times the 4.0% probability for their strong 
Democratic counterparts. To add context to the magnitude of these effects, party has 
somewhat greater impact than prayer frequency on respondents’ emphasis that their child 
and child’s spouse share their religion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Findings suggest that political orientation affects religious expression. At least for 
many Americans, religion is more than just a cause of political behavior. Political 
preferences influence satisfaction with a church, social integration in a church, 
investments of time and money into a church, and efforts to transmit the beliefs of that 
church. The empirical investigation here focuses on how politics can change churches by 
altering behavior of individual members. Future research on this question could address 
responses of voice and exit, examine the behavior of religious leaders, treat congregations 
as the unit of analysis, gather more detailed information about individual churches, study 
this process in other temporal or national contexts, or use panel data to assuage potential 
concerns about causal dynamics.
28
 
This essay’s findings challenge the commonly held understanding that an 
involvement in a church affects political preferences but politics does not affect 
relationships with churches, advising scholars of religion and politics to be wary of 
                                                 
28
See Supporting Information for a county level analysis of denominational growth 
suggesting these individual level findings have aggregate implications. 
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treating churches as exogenous to the political process. They suggest that principles of 
the separation of church and state need not require direct government intervention to be 
violated; the use of religion in political advocacy can influence religion in ways that some 
might deem adverse. By contracting the portion of Democrats in churches (Putnam 2001; 
Putnam and Campbell), the politicization of churches denies those Democrats a civic 
resource and threatens to diminish bridging social capital for members of both parties. 
This threat would be amplified if the theory tested here among churches applies to other 
forms of non-political voluntary associations such as local chambers of commerce or 
civic leagues. 
While reaffirming the importance of party identification (Bartels 2000), findings 
suggest that political polarization can bleed into non-political aspects of everyday life 
such as behavior within society’s sacred and private institutions. This raises concerns that 
polarization becomes self-perpetuating when it interacts with social group dynamics. The 
loss of Democrats in evangelical churches eliminates moderating voices within churches 
and Republican social networks (Levine 2005). Similarly, Democrats who become less 
involved in evangelical churches may move further toward the left. This creates a cycle 
with broad consequences. Due to asymmetrical generational replacement, contemporary 
sets of evangelicals may be replaced by increasingly Republican evangelicals. Swaying 
evangelicals should become increasingly difficult for Democratic campaigns. Democrats, 
in turn, may come to feel more negatively about theologically conservative Christians. 
The resulting partisan stratification along a secular-theistic divide could cause suboptimal 
policy outcomes as people underestimate the reconcilability of group conflict.  
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Supporting Information 
 
Coding of Protestant denominations is generally consistent with Layman and Green 
(2006) and Steensland et al (2000).  
 
Evangelical Protestants 
Seventh-Day Adventist, American Baptist Association, Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist 
General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist 
Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, National 
Association of Free Will Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Reformed Baptist, Southern Baptist 
Convention, Mennonite Church, Evangelical Covenant Church, Evangelical Free Church, 
Congregational Christian, Brethren in Christ, Mennonite Brethren, Christian and 
Missionary Alliance, Church of God (Anderson, Ind.), Church of the Nazarene, Free 
Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Church of God of Findlay, Ohio, 
Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America, Lutheran 
Church–Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Congregational 
Methodist, Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, Tenn.), Church of God 
(Huntsville, Al.), International Church of the Four Square Gospel, Pentecostal Church of 
God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God 
of Prophecy, Apostolic Pentecostal, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian 
Church in America, Evangelical Presbyterian, Christian Reformed Church. 
 
Note: Several small denominations are not represented in the data or the codebook does 
not fully distinguish the small denomination from a larger denominational label. For 
example, the ANES does not have a special code for Church of God of Findlay. 
 
Non-Evangelical 
Other Protestant denominations and non-denominational Protestants are coded as non-
evangelical Protestant. Given the importance of not conflating political preferences with 
religious tradition for the purposes of this paper, I break with this coding scheme in the 
case of ambiguous Protestants, which I code as non-evangelical. Layman and Green 
(2006) details in Appendix A: “Non-black individuals who identified themselves as 
fundamentalist, evangelical, or charismatic/spirit-filled were coded as evangelical 
Protestants.” and “Non-black individuals who identified themselves as liberal were coded 
as mainline Protestants.” While some non-denominational churches should ideally be 
classified as evangelical, it is difficult to distinguish them from those that are not. Placing 
members of evangelical non-denominational churches in the reference category should 
only make results harder to find. 
 
 
  
88 
 
Supporting Information continued 
 
 
The findings are unlikely to be a product of Republicans having more 
concentrated friends in organizations in general. The Baylor Religion Survey also asks 
“Thinking of your close friends, how many belong to the same charitable organizations as 
you?” Table B presents a replication of the model in Table 2 substituting this volunteer 
organization question as the dependent variable. Estimates do not show similar effects of 
party on friend in friendship in other organizations. Evangelical Republicans are more 
likely than evangelical Democrats to have concentrated friend groups in their church, a 
generally politicized organization, but not in the many other social organization that they 
may be members of that do not emphasize politics as stringently. 
Table C: Friends in Charitable Organizations as a Function of Party and Other Variables 
 Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Party -0.168 (0.152) 
Evangelical -0.115 (0.167) 
Party * Evangelical 0.137 (0.244) 
Age 0.999*** (0.243) 
Female -0.0414 (0.0772) 
Education 0.724*** (0.175) 
South -0.114 (0.0821) 
Income -0.0345 (0.169) 
Biblical Literalism 0.225* (0.127) 
Prayer Frequency 0.621*** (0.135) 
Cut 1 1.206*** (0.236) 
Cut 2 2.366*** (0.243) 
Cut 3 2.714*** (0.246) 
Cut 4 4.094*** (0.297) 
Observations 950 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 
 
Source: Baylor Religion Survey, 2005. 
Ordered Probit; Sample limited to Protestant and Catholics whites. Independent variables 
range from 0 to 1. DV: belong to the same charitable organizations as you. (1- none; 5 –
all) 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001-all one-tailed 
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Supporting Information continued 
Previous analysis contends that evangelical Republicans are more likely than 
evangelical Democrats to be satisfied with their church, be socially integrated into their 
church, invest in their church, and attempt to transmit their faith. Consequently, 
evangelical churches should be more likely to grow in geographic areas with higher 
proportions of Republicans. If so, the individual level findings above would be 
strengthened.  
County-level data allows a test of this hypothesis. The Association of Statisticians 
of American Religious Bodies conducted a county-level enumeration of churches and 
their members in 1990 and in 2000 (ASARB 1991; ASARB 2001).
29
 I merged these data 
with county-level political and demographic collected by Gomez et. al (2007) to create a 
panel dataset with county as the unit of analysis. 
Bivariate analysis suggests that the individual level findings presented above have 
aggregate consequences. The decline between 1990 and 2000 in the percentage of a 
county’s population belonging to a Southern Baptist Church, a bellwether evangelical 
denomination, was particularly sharp in Democratic trending counties.  In 1990, the mean 
Southern Baptist Convention attendance rate in all US counties was 14.3 percent. This 
declined to 12.8% in 2000. Democratic trending counties –those  below the mean in 1988 
to 1992 GOP presidential vote share change–   declined 1.68%, a decline statistically 
distinct (t = 4.16) and 36% greater than the 1.24% decline in more Republican trending 
counties.  
Table C presents a multivariate OLS model of county-level Southern Baptist 
Church adherence rate in 2000, calculated by dividing the number of SBC church 
                                                 
29
 See Jones et al (2002) for more information. 
90 
 
members by the county population. I include a lagged dependent variable of SBC 
adherence rate in 1990 to account for dynamism (Keele and Kelly 2006). The 
independent variable of primary interest is a county’s trend in Republican presidential 
vote share measured by subtracting 1992 county GOP vote share by 1988 GOP vote 
share. I include several other variables on the right hand side that could be associated 
with both a county’s voting pattern and it’s Southern Baptist Church adherence rate 
including county income level, unemployment rate, farms per capita, percent black , 
percent high school graduate. Each of these control variables reflects values for 1992, a 
year approximate to that of the lagged dependent variable. I employ robust standard 
errors clustered on the state. 
Generally, adherence rates are very stable- the lagged dependent variable explains 
considerable variation. However, counties that were moving toward the Republican Party 
in 1990 were more favorable to SBC church growth in 2000.
30
 GOP presidential vote 
share trend is positive and significant (coef.: 0.0551; std. error: 0.0271), as expected. The 
substantive impact of trending toward the GOP is also significant. A county that moved 
the maximum observed amount away from the Republican Party between 1988 and 1992 
had a simulated 2000 percentage of SBC membership at 11.76 percent. However, a 
county the moved the maximum observed amount toward the Republican Party between 
1988 and 1992 had a predicted 2000 percentage of SBC membership at 13.90 percent. 
This 2.13% impact is statistically significant and over twice as large as the impact of a 
50% difference in percentage black in a county. 
                                                 
30
 All counties in the United States are present in the data, but a model restricted to 
counties with at least one SBC church in 1990 yields a slightly larger coefficient. 
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Table D: County-Level Southern Baptist Church Adherence Rate in 2000 
 
Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
SBC Adherence Rate, 1990 0.900*** (0.0143) 
GOP President Vote Share (1992 minus 1988) 0.0551* (0.0271) 
Presidential Turnout 1992 0.0358** (0.0120) 
Percent Black 1992 0.0168 (0.0101) 
Percent High School 1992 0.0106 (0.0112) 
Farms per capita 1992 0.00705 (0.0123) 
Unemployment 1992 0.0153 (0.0219) 
Income 1992 -0.0400** (0.0163) 
Constant -0.0102 (0.0117) 
Observations 3,101 
 
Adj. R
2
 0.9763 
 Sources ASARB 1991; ASARB 2001; Gomez et. al 2007  
Dependent variable is SBC Adherence Rate in 2000 (SBC adherents / population). 
OLS regression. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 - one-tailed 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Social Groups and the Self-Intensifying Nature of Polarization 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 Scholarly debate on the existence and consequences of polarization in the United 
States maintains a primary focus on issue opinions. This study contends that attitudes 
about groups of people are also important but underappreciated in this dialogue. Feelings 
about groups across lines of political difference are a cause, effect, and direct 
embodiment of polarization. A divisive political environment encourages citizens to link 
subordinate social groups with superordinate political coalitions, thereby increasing the 
political relevance of social groups. Specifically, attitudes about liberals and 
conservatives influence attitudes about certain lightning-rod social groups. 
Simultaneously, views about social out-groups influence attitudes about liberals and 
conservatives more broadly. Analyses of feelings toward an important social group, 
Christian fundamentalists, suggest that polarization is a self-intensifying process with the 
potential to damage the social fabric of American life. 
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"I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and 
the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, 
People For the American Way, all of them who have tried to secularize America. I point 
the finger in their face and say 'you helped this happen.'"  
–Jerry Falwell speaking on September 13, 2001 
 
“The evil that he did will live after him. This is not just because of the wickedness that he 
actually preached, but because of the hole that he made in the "wall of separation" that 
ought to divide religion from politics.” 
-Christopher Hitchens writing after the death of Jerry Falwell 
 
Fiorina and others have described mass polarization as an overemphasized, even 
mythical, phenomenon rooted in misinterpretation rather than substantive difference. 
However, sound evidence from other scholars (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; 
Hetherington and Weiler 2009) suggest otherwise. Why might it seem like the United 
States is divided on issues if most citizens “are ambivalent and uncertain, and 
consequently reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or policies 
(Fiorina 2006)”? This essay makes the case that many Americans are ideologically 
polarized in feelings about some social groups and that this form of polarization is at least 
a partial explanation for deeper political divisions. 
Scholars have long recognized social groups as one of the principal factors 
influencing political behavior (e.g. Berelson et. al 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). Being part 
of a social group encourages a person to behave in a way consistent with the group’s 
political interests. Social groups influence political cognitions, ideology, and policy 
preferences (Lau 1986; Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Brady and Sniderman 1985; 
Sears et al. 1980). Kinder (2003) makes a compelling case that group-orientations remain 
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vital to understanding American politics. I argue that the heightened political divisiveness 
of contemporary politics has only strengthened the importance of social groups. 
In a well-sorted electorate, many social groups that form for non-political reasons 
are increasingly likely to play major political roles. When groups become involved in 
politics, the public responds by linking social groups to larger political coalitions, 
potentially altering group preferences (Miller et al. 1991). Because polarization has led 
more social groups to be associated with these coalitions, political polarization increases 
the political relevance of social groups. Feelings about some social groups, distinct from 
group membership as traditionally-emphasized, have become an important factor in 
American political behavior. Not only are social group perceptions more important 
because of polarization, but feelings toward social groups function like issue opinions as 
manifestations of polarization itself. Feelings toward social groups should rank alongside 
ideology and partisanship as key components in research on the existence and 
consequences of polarization. 
I maintain that the current American political environment encourages 
polarization in preferences toward social groups. These polarized preferences in turn 
exacerbate polarization more broadly. As illustrated in Figure 1, the political relevance of 
social groups is central to a multi-step process that generates self-intensifying 
polarization. Mass political polarization makes it easier for citizens to link social groups 
with broader political coalitions. People react to some social groups much as they react to 
coalitions. Those who are in agreement with the coalition respond favorably to the group 
while those who disagree with the coalition respond negatively. As a group becomes 
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increasingly associated with the larger political divide, several subsequent processes 
activate preferences about that group to influence attitudes members of the coalition.  
 
Figure 1: The Self-Intensifying Nature of Polarization 
 
Through a variety of sources, I show an evolution in opinion towards a major 
social group associated with partisan conflict, Christian fundamentalists. I then show that 
ideology is a major cause of attitude change toward this group. Politicized attitudes 
toward Christian fundamentalists subsequently influence attitudes toward a larger 
political group, conservatives, but do so asymmetrically as liberals react more extremely 
than conservatives. Instead of being insulated from or only symptomatic of broader 
political conflict, feelings toward social groups have a major effect on polarization by 
moving synchronously to cause cyclical expansions and contractions of political conflict. 
 
How Polarization Links Subordinate Groups with Superordinate Groups 
 
In a divisive political context within a complex society, political actors exist at 
varying levels of abstraction. Individuals are members of small groups and large groups. 
Polarized 
Feelings about 
(Subordinate) 
Social Groups 
Polarized Feelings 
about 
(Superordinate) 
Political Coalitions 
Divisive 
Political 
Context 
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Small groups often take political stands that are in line or in direct sequence with large 
groups. As a result, people can draw connections between subordinate groups and 
superordinate groups. Social groups, being relatively small, are subordinate groups while 
broader political coalitions are superordinate groups. Intense political conflict leads social 
groups to journey deeper into the political fray, making it easier for people to link social 
groups with broader coalitions. This linking increases the political relevance of social 
groups by influencing attitudes about members of both superordinate and subordinate 
groups in a bidirectional process. 
First, considerations of superordinate groups structure people’s thoughts about 
subordinate groups. Subordinate social groups grow to become defined by superordinate 
broad political coalitions. Those who support a political coalition should increase support 
for a linked social group while those who oppose a political coalition should decrease 
support for a linked social group. Second, and in turn, considerations of subordinate 
groups structure thinking about superordinate groups. Either appealing or unappealing 
aspects of the social group define the coalition, its members, and its organizational 
manifestations. 
When politics are contentious, political elites, the media, and groups themselves 
accentuate the political role of social groups. If a competitive political environment 
creates vanishing national margins of success with elections decided by only a few 
percentage points, even relatively small sets of people can appear decisive. Political elites 
from all sides become ever more concerned with targeting social groups that can provide 
them with valuable conglomerations of potential supporters (Hillygus and Shields 2008). 
These elites are incentivized to do two things that make social groups divisive. First, they 
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employ group-centric appeals that directly engage a group’s preferences. Second, they 
make appeals to groups of voters that are specifically designed to contrast with features 
of another group that some members of the targeted group are prone to dislike. For 
example, anti-welfare appeals often communicate negative information about blacks to 
white voters (Gilens 1999; Hancock 2004). Similarly, social groups themselves increase 
political activity when polarized politics engenders threat and activates group-
consciousness. The resulting context of groups falling into well-sorted coalitions lends 
itself to the media strengthening this pattern by relaying convenient, if oversimplified, 
stories framed in the light of group conflict. 
This increasing political divisiveness causes social groups and ideological camps 
to enter into increasingly symbiotic relationships. A person’s ideology, defined by 
Converse (1964) as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are 
bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence,” influences 
whether the political positions associated with a group is consistent with a person’s 
preexisting preferences. Liberals should come to view members of groups associated with 
conservative preferences negatively while they come to view members of liberal 
associated groups positively. The inverse should hold for conservatives. This causes 
ideology to transfer attitudes about the superordinate group to attitudes about the linked 
subordinate group. 
Transferring attitudes about the social group- the subordinate group- to attitudes 
about the broader coalition- the superordinate group- relies on attitudes toward the 
subordinate group itself. In the contemporary American case, political coalitions are 
complex. People can think of political coalitions as sets of individuals or organizations 
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asking for their attachment. This means that feelings about social groups should also 
influence feelings about liberals and conservatives. 
Other studies have established a tendency for in-groups to respond to threat more 
strongly than out-groups (Cairns et al. 2006; Hewstone et al. 2002). I also expect an 
uneven influence of subordinate feelings on superordinate feelings, but in a different 
direction. Members of a political coalition should respond more strongly to a social group 
if that social group is an outgroup. Conservatives should think of liberals in terms of 
liberal groups while not thinking of themselves of in terms of conservatives groups. A 
similar asymmetry should hold for liberals. Two processes support this imbalance. First, 
outgroup members likely perceive more homogeneity in social group members than do 
members of the social group’s coalition. Second, a group’s status can be clearer from 
afar. Members of a coalition supported by a social group who are not members of the 
social group itself should view themselves as allies with the group rather than members 
of the group itself, denying the social group members clear ingroup status. However, 
those within a coalition that is threatened by the social group can make a clearer outgroup 
distinction. This means that people tend to offer greater punishment to those who help 
them directly than they offer rewards to those who aid their friends.  
 
Why People Link Social Groups with Political Coalitions: Information Processing 
and Social Identity 
 
What mechanisms create this linkage between subordinate and superordinate 
groups? Specifically, why do peoples connect social groups with political coalitions? I 
argue that two coinciding psychological mechanisms create political dynamism between 
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coalitions and feelings toward groups. The first mechanism is information processing. 
The second mechanism is social identity. 
By creating an environment in which social groups become associated with 
political information, political conflict should influence how people process additional 
information regarding social groups and broader political coalitions. This happens for 
three reasons. First, people are cognitively limited and, therefore, process and retrieve 
information using schema, “organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with 
specific instances” (Fiske and Linville, 1980, p. 543; also see Conover 1984). By using a 
similar schema when thinking of social groups and broader coalitions, a person considers 
both in the same manner, gains consistency in understanding the world, and, importantly, 
moves new information about the group and the coalition in tandem, creating cognitive 
links between both.  
The second information processing reason that people link subordinate and 
superordinate groups is that linkages foster balance in a person’s likes and dislikes. By 
aligning feelings about a social group in a partisan conflict with feelings about an 
ideological division, a person maintains consistency in likes and dislikes (Heider 1958). 
People tend to like groups that are supportive of their political allies while disliking 
groups that are sympathetic towards their political opponents (Aronson and Cope 1968; 
Hummon and Dorien 2003). Those who support the social group should see the broader 
movement it aligns with as a mutual friend worthy of reward for sharing a common rival, 
inducing positive preferences about the coalition. Meanwhile, those who are opposed to 
the social group could feel threatened by a friend to their enemy, inducing negative 
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preferences about the broader movement. Such a balance avoids dissonance and promotes 
consistency.  
By advocating values and positions inconsistent with a person’s support for a 
coalition, the group introduces considerations that are psychologically unpleasant or 
dissonant (Festinger 1957). Much like an individual devaluing the credibility of a 
conflicting information source, lowering preferences about the group or the coalition 
itself helps the individual reconcile this dissonance. A social group’s political positions 
should have a contrasting effect among those who agree with the group. If a group’s 
political machinations provide an affirming narrative that the social group should produce 
consonance rather than dissonance within an individual. By embracing the message 
valuing the credibility of the source, individuals embrace an affirming narrative that 
provides consistency in understanding of the world (Jost et al. 2004; Jost et al. 2008). As 
a result, linking groups and broader coalition provides consistency within an individual’s 
preferences that can lead to improved feelings about the group or the coalition. 
Finally, the third information processing explanation happens unconsciously. 
Groups taking positions in line with a coalition make it easy for a person to align 
connections about social groups and coalitions in the same direction. These connections 
can be positive or negative, depending on that persons underlying pool of considerations 
about the position. This means that new information about both the subordinate and 
superordinate group carries the same valence, that new information is affectively 
congruent. An information processing bias emerges (Lodge and Taber 2005), making it 
easier for supporters of a social group to connect the positive aspects of the social group 
with the supporters of the coalition. Conversely, people have more difficulty connecting 
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negative information about one level of social organization with positive aspects of 
another. This unconscious relative ease of using congruent information makes it natural 
for a person to organize new information about social groups in the same direction as 
new information about coalitions, thereby creating links between multiple levels of social 
organization. 
In addition to the mechanics of political information processing, social identities 
influence the connection of social groups and broader political coalition within a divisive 
political context. Social identities are important (Tajfel 1872). By offering individuals a 
way to recognize “collective awareness” of a groups existence (Turner 1987), groups 
inform an important basis of social identity. Most Americans are members of an ingroup 
defined by liberal or conservative political coalitions. Those who are not supporters of 
that coalition serve as members of an outgroup and are, consequently, treated differently 
(Brewer 1979).  
When a social group’s policies or candidates align with a coalition’s preferences, 
that person should see the social group as an ally in a political struggle and respond with 
more positive feelings toward members of the social group. However, when those 
policies or candidates oppose a coalition’s preferences, that person should see the group 
as an enemy in a political struggle and respond with more negative feelings. A polarizing 
process forms that is based on the interdependent nesting of social group and coalitional 
group identities. Supporters of one side of a political divide move toward a social group, 
mutual ingroup members. Meanwhile, followers of the other coalition move away from 
the social group, perceiving that social groups’ members as part of an outgroup. 
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In a political landscape defined by sharp dichotomies, conflict intensity, such as 
brought about by polarization, increases the differentiation between outgroups and 
ingroups (Brewer 1999; Levin and Sidanius 1999). High intergroup conflict encourages 
outgroup negativity and ingroup favoritism (Hewstone et al. 2002). Polarization can 
create the impression of competition for material or ideological resources, reinforcing 
group consciousness (see Blumer 1958, Bobo and Hutchings 1996, and Esses et al. 1998 
for a treatment of resource competition influences on immigration and racial attitudes). If 
a divisive context inspires threat, people should increase their preference for intragroup 
homogeneity (Huddy 2001). Additionally, if polarization weakens other cross-group ties 
in society, people are left with fewer reasons to feel more positive about outgroups 
(Paolini et al. 2004; Wright et al. 1997). 
While membership is distinct from attachment and may have additional 
consequences, the political relevance of feelings toward a social group is independent of 
social group membership. Psychological attachment, not just objective membership, leads 
to social identification (Lau 1989). Social group membership might moderate, but not 
extinguish, the effects of social group-coalition linkage. Furthermore, group involvement 
itself may be compromised if a person’s political positions cause adequate internal 
conflict.  
 
Which Social Groups Link with Political Coalitions? 
 
Many social groups participate in political conflict. However, only some have 
sufficient characteristics for feelings toward its members to be polarized by the broader 
conflict and for preferences about it to change other group attitudes. The same factors 
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that sketch the contours of partisan polarization also encourage linked preferences. First, 
the group should take clear positions on issues, making themselves seem significantly 
different than others. Second, the positions taken by the group should be salient or at least 
visible to many people. Third, the positions should touch issues that are “broad and deep” 
with the “capacity to provoke resistance” (Layman 2001). Fourth, positions taken by the 
group should seem irreconcilable with positions held by members of the other 
superordinate group. Fifth, the composition of the group should seem homogeneous in 
political goals, bolstering entitativity and fostering differentiating stereotypes (Turner et 
al. 1987). Sixth, a group should appear politically effective enough to induce intergroup 
threat, which promotes negative outgroup attitudes (Riek et al. 2006). 
 
Expectations and Research Design 
 
This theory lends itself to two generalized expectations regarding polarization and 
the connection between social groups and political coalitions. First, I expect attitudes 
about superordinate political coalitions to influence attitudes toward some subordinate 
social groups. Second and simultaneously, I expect attitudes toward social group to 
influence attitudes about members of the superordinate political coalitions. However, the 
influence of feelings toward social group members on feelings about coalition members 
should be asymmetrical. Those who view the coalition as an outgroup should react more 
negatively than members of the coalition itself react positively. 
Systematic tests of these expectations involving the entire myriad of idiosyncratic 
social groups operating within American society would be unwieldy. Therefore, the 
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research design is a case study focused on one particularly important social group, 
Christian fundamentalists. I begin by establishing that attitudes toward this group are 
polarized. Liberals and conservatives have grown increasingly disparate over the last two 
decades. Then, I apply the two generalized expectations to Christian fundamentalists to 
test three specific hypotheses. 
H1: The Influence of Superordinate Groups on Subordinate Groups 
Negative feelings about conservatives cause negative feelings about Christian 
fundamentalists while positive feelings about conservatives cause positive 
feelings about Christian fundamentalists. 
 
H2: The Influence of Subordinate Groups on Superordinate Groups 
Negative feelings about Christian fundamentalists cause negative feelings about 
conservatives while positive feelings about Christian fundamentalists cause 
positive feelings about conservatives. 
 
H3: The Asymmetric Influence of Subordinate Groups on Superordinate 
Outgroups 
The effect of feelings about Christian fundamentalists should be greater for 
liberals than for conservatives. 
 
 
I rely on panel and cross sectional surveys from the American National Election 
study to test these hypotheses. I begin by using the 1948-2008 cumulative file to establish 
that preferences about Christian fundamentalists have polarized over time. Next, I use 
structural equations and the 2000-2004 panel surveys to isolate feelings towards 
conservatives as the driving force behind this polarization. I continue with these panel 
surveys to find that preferences about Christian fundamentalists drive preferences about 
conservatives, but primarily among liberals. I then supplement observational results with 
experimental analyses using the panel dataset. 
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Christian Fundamentalists: The Test Group 
 
Christian fundamentalists provide an exemplary case to study how polarization of 
subordinate groups linking with superordinate coalitions. Those who identify as Christian 
fundamentalists have been a consistent force in American politics (Wilcox and Larson 
2005), serving as a lightning rod to inspire loyalty among conservatives and hostility 
among liberals (Bolce and De Maio 1999). Christian fundamentalists often promote 
outcomes such as abortion restriction or creationism in classrooms that are quite contrary 
to most liberals’ policy goals. Similarly, Christian fundamentalists cause electoral threat 
to liberals by supporting conservative candidates. As argued by Hunter (1991), elites 
attach a religious-secular divide to many issues. This divide influences voting patterns 
(Campbell et al. 2011) while allowing disparate conservative groups to find common 
ground with Christian fundamentalists. For instance, despite distinctive positions on 
issues like capital punishment and creationism, conservative Catholic elites tend to be 
supportive of the Christian Right (Bendyna et al. 2001). Popular media only make 
differences in perceptions seem bigger (Bolce and De Maio 2007; Haskell 2007; Kerr 
2003). Left-leaning publications have increasingly linked religious groups with the 
Republican Party while depicting religious groups in a negative light (Pieper 2011). And, 
the popular perception of religious beliefs as deeply-seated and unwavering makes 
differences feel irreconcilable. 
Ample evidence from surveys clearly supports a view of polarizing preferences 
about Christian fundamentalists. Figure 2 depicts pairwise correlations between various 
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political variables and the Christian fundamentalist thermometer over time.
31
 The trend 
lines portray a clear, strengthening relationship between feelings toward Christian 
fundamentalists and perceptions of the right. Among all variables, white American’s 
feelings toward Christian fundamentalists were the least tied to politics in 1988, the first 
year the American National Election Study asked the question. Following a spike in the 
1992 election cycle, the correlation between Christian fundamentalist preferences and 
political variables plateaued throughout the Clinton administration. The 2000 election 
marked the beginning a second resurgence in the politicization of preferences, a 
resurgence that peaked in 2004 only to ebb slightly once George W. Bush was off the 
ballot in 2008. Ideology shows a particularly strong correlation with the thermometer 
over time. In 1988, the correlation between ideology and the thermometer was 0.16. It 
doubled to 0.33 by 1992, and it once again increased in 2004 to 0.44.
32
 
The emergent gap between liberals and conservatives in attitudes toward Christian 
fundamentalists is also apparent in simple univariate analysis. Figure 3 shows 
overlapping histograms comparing liberals’ and conservatives’ distributions of 
preferences about Protestants, Catholics, and Christian fundamentalists in 1988 and 
                                                 
31The relationship between ideology and preferences about Christian fundamentalists is 
confounded among non-whites. Subsequent analyses avoid this complication to 
underlying assumptions by limiting samples to whites. See Supporting Information B for 
further discussion. 
32
Offering context to the magnitude of this correlation, the correlation between party and 
ideology has ranged from 0.27 in 1972 to 0.54 in 2004 (ANES 1948-2008). 
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2004.
33
 Among both liberals and conservatives in 1988, the modal response to the 100-
point Christian fundamentalist thermometer was 50, a neutral response that was 
consistent with preferences about many groups. By 2004, conservatives had shifted 
toward more positive feelings while liberals reported more negative feelings. Fifty-seven 
percent of conservatives provided better than neutral evaluations of Christian 
fundamentalists, but only 11 percent liberals evaluated the group positively. A bimodal 
distribution with little overlap emerged, approaching even stringent standards of 
polarization established by Fiorina (2006).  
 
                                                 
33
 The Protestant thermometer is not available in 1988, 2004, or 2008 surveys. Therefore, 
I use values from 1976 and 2000 surveys for this group. 
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Figure 2: Christian Fundamentalists 
Thermometer Correlations, 1988-2004 
Party ID Ideology Conservatives Thermometer
Source: American National Election Study, 1948-2004 
Note: Whites only. Pearson's Correlation between Christian 
fundamentalists thermometer and other variables by year. 
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To put the 2004 difference between liberals and conservatives on Christian 
fundamentalist preferences into perspective, liberals and conservatives are more polarized 
in their opinions about Christian fundamentalists than citizens in “red” and “blue” states 
are polarized in their opinions about policy issues. Overlap coefficients measure the 
common area between two distributions and range from 0, implying complete separation 
of distributions, to 1, implying maximum overlap (Inman and Bradley 1985). The 2004 
distributions of conservative and liberal evaluations of Christian fundamentalists have an 
overlap coefficient of 0.55. In comparison, Levendusky and Pope (2011) find a 0.77 
overlap coefficient during 2006 between citizen social issues preferences in New York, a 
solidly blue state, and Utah, a solidly red state. The ideological divide appears confined 
to feelings about Christian fundamentalists rather than feelings about Christians in 
general. The overlap coefficient is 0.82 for the Catholic thermometer and 0.92 for the 
Protestant thermometer.
34
 
                                                 
34
 I calculated the above overlap coefficient using Goldstein’s Stata package (1994) using 
2004 NES data. Liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning moderates are included, 
variances are treated as unequal, and the distributions are limited to whites. 
109 
 
 
 
The ideological divide over Christian fundamentalists is not a general pattern 
applicable to all religious groups. Questions asking about Catholics and Protestants in 
general show no such change. Both conservatives and liberals remained warm to both 
religious traditions in earlier and later surveys, discrediting the existence of a liberal 
tendency to decrease in preferences about religious groups in general or a conservative 
tendency to increase.
35
 Rather, the tendency is for movement of preferences about the 
politically salient religious groups. 
                                                 
35
 Consistent with prior research (McDermott 2007), Figure 2 also shows that Catholics 
have become more popular overtime, especially among conservatives. 
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Source: American National Election Studies, 1948-2008. Overlapping Histograms. Whites Only.
Liberals          Conservatives
Figure #: Feeling Thermometers Responses: Liberals vs. ConservativesFigure 3: 
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However, sorting could be explained by a change in the characteristics of liberals 
and conservatives rather than a fundamental change in the relationship between ideology 
and group preferences. Models from 1988 to 2008 American National Election Study 
surveys appear in Table 1 and account for this possibility by controlling for variables that 
could influence both ideology and group preferences. The independent variables of 
interest are liberal and conservative dummy variables. True moderates serve as the 
reference category for comparison. Controls include age, education, gender, income, 
residency in the South, church attendance, and biblical literalism. Figure 4 plots those 
models’ coefficients for ideology dummy variables by year. 
Ideology has always had some role over the last two decades in preferences about 
Christian fundamentalists. However, the politicization of Christian fundamentalists has 
come in several waves over the last two decades. As indicated by Model 1 in Table 1, 
conservatives had more positive feelings about the group than liberals prior to the 
watershed 1992 election, but ideology differences were subtle. Even in 1988, liberals 
were more negative and conservatives were more positive than moderates in the reference 
category, though the conservative dummy failed to achieve statistical significance. 
However, the effect of ideology grew tremendously. By 1992, the estimate for the 
conservative dummy had tripled from 1.921 to 7.254, gaining statistical significance. 
Meanwhile, the liberal dummy maintained significance at -3.016. The sequence of 
change is notable throughout this period. Conservatives reacted to the rise of politically 
active Christian fundamentalists before liberals, first showing a major change during the 
1992 election. Though, liberals’ reaction may have been slower than conservatives, it was 
still pronounced. The liberal coefficient shifted away from Christian fundamentalists 
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between 1992 and 1996, taking a lead over the absolute value of the conservative 
coefficient that it would maintain through 2008.
36
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Throughout this essay, people who refused to answer or did not know their answer to 
the ideology questions are coded as true moderates. Estimates are not significantly altered 
by this effort to preserve cases. 
Table 1: Feeling toward Christian Fundamentalists as Function of Ideology and Other 
Variables 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Year: 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Liberal -3.900* -3.016* -6.741*** -5.784* -8.745*** -7.629*** 
 
(1.961) (1.433) (1.730) (2.715) (2.157) (1.793) 
Conservative 1.921 7.254*** 3.026* 3.692 8.619*** 7.585*** 
 (1.474) (1.231) (1.447) (2.343) (1.855) (1.574) 
Church Attendance 
Frequency 
10.79*** 9.192*** 8.019*** 6.232* 8.662*** 7.820*** 
(1.885) (1.391) (1.737) (2.819) (2.271) (1.884) 
Biblical Literalism 23.43*** 22.09*** 25.93*** 23.35*** 26.50*** 15.43*** 
 
(2.324) (1.827) (2.130) (3.585) (2.828) (2.175) 
Age -9.153* -12.87*** -6.540* -4.696 -6.697 -1.274 
 
(3.963) (3.082) (3.700) (6.380) (4.638) (3.867) 
South 3.637** 3.384** 1.638 -0.482 3.018* 3.871** 
 
(1.489) (1.223) (1.336) (2.249) (1.788) (1.339) 
Income -4.098 -7.544*** -7.061** 5.803 1.976 -6.155** 
 
(2.698) (2.107) (2.462) (4.052) (2.845) (2.636) 
Female -0.501 -0.905 -0.873 -0.871 1.847 4.656*** 
 
(1.330) (1.051) (1.235) (2.083) (1.576) (1.313) 
Education -9.075*** -11.96*** -5.907** -12.48** -13.43*** -11.84*** 
 
(2.623) (2.114) (2.500) (4.160) (3.149) (2.793) 
Constant 38.62*** 48.21*** 42.39*** 39.63*** 42.67*** 46.40*** 
 
(3.352) (2.462) (3.017) (5.032) (3.446) (2.926) 
Observations 1067 1340 960 395 636 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.317 0.320 0.253 0.392 0.295 
Source: American National Election Study 1948-2008 
Dependent variable is feeling toward Christian Fundamentalists (0 - 100). Reference category consists of 
moderates.  OLS; Sample limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  
*** p<0.001 (one-tailed). Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. 
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As with other indicators of polarization (Jacobson 2006), the George W. Bush 
administration accompanied historically extreme levels of ideological division about 
Christian fundamentalist. Ideology played its greatest role on attitudes toward the group 
during George W. Bush’s reelection when the liberal coefficient reached -8.745 and the 
conservative reach 8.619. Perhaps due to the absence of a presidential candidate 
associated with Christian fundamentalists on a personal level, the effects of the ideology 
dummies subsided slightly in 2008. While the effects of ideology have ebbed and flowed 
over the last twenty years, the general trend is stable regardless of changing 
demographics of the various coalitions. Attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists have 
become divided along ideological lines. 
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In 2011, the Southern Baptist Convention recognized a crisis of long term 
membership- new baptisms were at historic lows while membership was in decline 
(Smietana 2012). The largest Protestant denomination in the United States, the affiliation 
of “America's Pastor” Billy Graham, and a standard bearer for America's unique role as 
the most religious developed country convened a group to address this looming threat. 
The primary function of this assembly was to drop "Southern" from their name, fretting 
that a regional tie hampered their future. However, the problem was likely political 
polarization.
37
 Billy Graham was no longer the most salient Baptist. Politically active 
leaders like Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell had become the archetypes of Christian 
fundamentalists for most Americans. These leaders were much more politically active 
and divisive, evinced by evaluations of Falwell and Robertson being correlated with 
political preferences much more strongly than were evaluations of Graham or Oral 
Roberts.
38
 As a result, opinions toward their group had polarized alongside broader 
ideological groupings. Conservatives liked Christian fundamentalists more, but liberals 
liked them less. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 For an argument that polarization led to political preferences affecting church 
attendance and other religious behavior, see Husser (n.d.) and Husser (n.d.). 
38
 See Supporting Information C for more extensive analysis based on data from a 2006 
Newsweek survey. 
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The Effect of Superordinate Group Preferences on Subordinate Group Preferences 
 
Cross-sectional surveys show a major sorting of preferences about Christian 
fundamentalists along ideological lines. I turn to the American National Election Study, 
2000-2004 Panel to investigate whether superordinate group feelings explain these 
changes in subordinate group preferences. I conduct two tests of these causal dynamic. 
The first test is a multivariate analysis of lagged ideology’s influence on 
contemporaneous Christian fundamentalist preferences. Respondents who are liberal in 
2000 should feel negatively towards Christian fundamentalists in 2004 while respondents 
who are conservatives should have positively towards Christian fundamentalists in 2004. 
The second test relies on randomized ordering of feeling thermometers to enhance 
internal validity by analyzing the effect of group primes.  
Table 2 reports the multivariate analysis of Christian fundamentalist preferences. 
Because theory suggests endogeneity, I employ two-stage least squares. Feelings toward 
conservatives, measured in 2000, serve as both the instrumented variable and the 
independent variable of central concern.
 39
 Also on the right hand side of the model are 
2000 measures of party, education, and income. By including a lagged measure of the 
dependent variable, the model accounts for respondent’s baseline preferences and better 
reflects change over time within individuals (Kelly and Keele 2006). 
                                                 
39
 Supporting Information D provides first-stage estimates for instrumentl variable 
models, all of which have an F-score greater than 10. Traditional OLS estimates, 
consistent with analysis of thermometers by other scholars (e.g. Berinsky and 
Mendelberg 2005), are reported in Supporting Information E. 
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Table 2: Feelings about Christian Fundamentalists in 2004 as a function of Feelings about 
Conservatives in 2000 
 
Param. 
Est. 
(Std. 
Error) 
Thermometer: Conservatives 00 33.54* (19.53) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 00 50.22*** (8.693) 
Party 00 6.948 (4.931) 
Education 00 -10.04*** (3.055) 
Income 00 -10.24 (6.456) 
Constant 12.33* (5.674) 
Observations 463 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.470 
 Source: American National Election Study,  2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Christian Fundamentalists Thermometer. 
Two-stage least squares; Sample limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 
1. * p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed 
 
Consistent with expectations, feelings about conservatives, members of the 
superordinate coalition, influence feelings about Christian fundamentalists, members of 
the subordinate social group. The estimate of the lagged and instrumented Christian 
fundamentalist thermometer is positive and significant (coef.: 50.22; std. error.: 8.693). 
This implies a major substantively important effect. Even though education often leads to 
less attachment to fundamentalists (Shields 2005), feelings toward conservatives are 
considerably more influential than education (coef: -10.04; std. error: 3.055 ) on feelings 
toward Christian fundamentalists. 
 
The Effect of Subordinate Group Preferences on Superordinate Group Preferences 
 
As attitudes toward the social group become informed by political preferences, 
they should come to influence attitudes toward supporters of their associated political 
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movements, at least for those who consider the social group’s coalition to be threatening. 
To test the effects of feelings toward Christian fundamentalists on feelings of 
conservatives, I again turn to the 2000-2004 American National Election Study Panel 
Survey. Table 3 reports two-stage least squares models of the conservative feeling 
thermometer. The dependent variable is the 2004 conservative thermometer ranging from 
0 (least positive) to 100 (most positive). The independent variable of primary concern is 
the Christian fundamentalist feeling thermometer. I also included party, income, 
education, and a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side. All independent 
variables are on a 0-1 interval and are from the 2000 wave of the panel. Because I expect 
the effects of feelings toward social groups to be conditional on ideology, I include a full 
sample model and two split sample model reflecting only conservatives or only liberals.  
Estimates follow expectations in all models reported in Table 3. The main effect 
of the Christian fundamentalist thermometer is significant in the full sample of Model 1 
(coef: 37.02; std. error: 10.21). However, the effect of group preferences on preferences 
about conservatives is moderated by ideology and largely driven by liberals. The effect of 
the Christian fundamentalist thermometer is substantively and statistically significant 
(coef: 28.57; std. error: 13.15) for liberals. Among liberals, positive feelings toward 
Christian fundamentalists in 2000 are associated with positive feelings toward 
conservatives in 2004, even when feelings toward conservatives in 2000 are held 
constant. On the other hand, the effect of Christian fundamentalist preferences is not 
significant for conservatives. As shown in Model 3, the Christian fundamentalist 
thermometer is in the expected direction but insignificant among conservatives (coef: 
17.26; std. error: 11.01). This supports Hypothesis 3 which anticipates that liberals think 
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of conservatives in terms of Christian fundamentalists while conservatives are much less 
likely to think of themselves according to feelings about the social group. 
 
Table 3: Feelings toward Conservatives in 2004 as a Function of Feelings toward Christian 
Fundamentalists in 2000 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
All Liberals Conservatives 
 Param. Est Param. Est Param. Est 
 (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists00 37.02*** 69.97** 17.26 
 
(10.21) (29.77) (11.01) 
Thermometer: Conservatives 00 22.20** -5.256 27.66*** 
 
(8.248) (27.19) (8.074) 
Party 00 19.12*** 14.94* 12.56*** 
 
(2.572) (6.750) (3.355) 
Education 00 0.437 1.383 -0.197 
 
(2.840) (6.161) (3.442) 
Income00 0.620 -6.091 3.256 
 
(5.502) (13.45) (6.161) 
Constant 18.23*** 17.49** 31.18*** 
 
(3.398) (6.057) (5.011) 
Observations 460 141 273 
Adjusted R-squared 0.401 0.304 0.229 
Source: American National Election Study,  2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Conservative Thermometer. Two-stage least squares; Sample 
limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. * p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, 
one-tailed 
 
Experimental Evidence for Self-Intensifying Polarization 
 
The American National Election Study Panel provides an additional opportunity 
to test the causal relationship underlying the self-intensifying nature of polarization 
through two survey experiments, one testing the effects of superordinate political 
coalitions on subordinate social groups and the other testing the inverse. The 2004 wave 
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of the 2000-2004 panel randomized presentation order of thermometer questions about a 
variety of groups such as big business, feminists, Southerners, and conservatives.  
Consequently, some survey respondents received a question asking them to rate how 
warmly they felt toward conservatives and liberals prior to their rating of Christian 
fundamentalists. Similarly, some people received a question about Christian 
fundamentalists prior to answering a question about conservatives. 
By asking a question about some groups before others, researchers made 
considerations about groups more accessible to respondents. As a result, some 
respondents were primed to evaluate Christian fundamentalists in light of previous 
evaluations toward liberals and conservatives, overtly political groups. These respondents 
compose a treatment group for the first experiment. Those who were asked the liberals 
thermometer after the Christian fundamentalist thermometer were not similarly primed 
when evaluating Christian fundamentalists, making them members of a control group for 
the first experiment. The second experiment follows similar logic. The treatment group 
consists of those individuals who were primed to consider a subordinate social group, 
Christian fundamentalists, prior to their evaluation of conservatives, the superordinate 
social group. Similarly, those who were asked about Christian fundamentalists after their 
evaluation of conservatives compose a control group. 
That these experiments are embedded within a panel survey is particularly useful 
as it creates the opportunity to test effects of the political coalition or social group prime 
with information about a subject’s prior evaluations, potentially revealing conditional 
relationships. The political prime should cause those who had positive preferences about 
Christian fundamentalists in 2000 to have even more positive feelings about the Christian 
119 
 
fundamentalists in 2004. Conversely, the political prime should cause even more negative 
preferences about Christian fundamentalist in 2004 for those who reported negative 
preferences in 2000. Those with relatively neutral preferences about Christian 
fundamentalists should not respond differently regardless of the political prime. 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates for the first experiment. The dependent variable is 
feelings toward Christian fundamentalists, measured in 2004. The independent variables 
are the political prime, a 2000 measure of the dependent variable, and the interaction of 
the two. The political prime is coded zero if a respondent did not receive a thermometer 
question about liberals or conservatives before the Christian fundamentalist question, one 
if a respondent receive either the liberals or conservatives thermometer before, and two if 
the respondent received both the liberals and conservatives thermometers before the 
dependent variable. As with prior analysis, the sample is restricted to whites. 
 
Table 4: The Effect of  Political Prime on Feelings about Christian Fundamentalists 
 
Param. Est. (Std. Error) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 2000 57.43*** (5.996) 
Political Prime -3.993* (2.358) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 2000 * Political 
Prime 7.716* (4.319) 
Constant 24.62*** (3.196) 
Observations 554 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.379 
 Source: American National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Christian Fundamentalist Thermometer. OLS regression; 
Sample limited to whites. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 one-tailed. 
  
120 
 
 Ordering effects are significant in the expected direction. Estimates are significant 
for the political prime (coef.: -3.993; std. err: 2.358), the lagged dependent variable 
(coef.: 57.43; std. err: 5.996), and their interaction (coef.: 7.716; std. err: 4.319). Figure 5 
graphs the effect of receiving both the liberal and conservatives thermometer prime 
conditional on lagged feelings toward Christian fundamentalists. Though confidence 
intervals imply that effects border traditional levels of significance, the basic pattern is 
clear. Those exposed to the political prime who liked Christian fundamentalists already 
like them even more while those who disliked the group members came to dislike them 
even more. The effect of the political prime was -7.97 points for those rated Christian 
fundamentalists at the minimum zero in 2000. However, the prime led to a 7.45 point 
increase for those who rated Christian fundamentalists at the maximum100 in 2000. The 
total effect of the political prime is roughly equivalent to the difference between 
Protestants and Catholics on Christian fundamentalist preferences. Such a substantively 
important effect from the minor manipulation of question ordering is strong evidence 
supporting the theoretical mechanism that perceptions of superordinate political 
coalitions influences perceptions of social groups. 
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 Having shown experimental evidence of the effect of superordinate considerations 
on subordinate group perceptions, I conduct a parallel experiment testing the effect of 
subordinate considerations on feelings about superordinate groups. This second 
experiment appears in Table 5 as an OLS model of feelings about conservatives in 2004. 
Equivalent to the first experiment, the independent variables are the subordinate group 
prime, the dependent variable lagged to 2000, and their interaction. Those who received 
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the prime were coded as one while those who did not were coded as zero. The sample is 
constrained to white. 
Table 5: The Effect of Christian Fundamentalist Prime on Feelings about Conservatives 
 
Param. Est. Std. Error 
Thermometer Conservatives 2000 53.62*** (4.641) 
Christian Fundamentalist Prime -5.853 (4.505) 
Prime * Therm: Conservatives 2000 14.31* (7.094) 
Constant 26.52*** (2.963) 
Observations 621 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.322 
 Source: American National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Conservatives Thermometer. OLS regression; Sample limited 
to whites. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 one-tailed. Independent variables range 
from 0 to 1. 
 
 As with estimates of attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists, the effect of the 
prime is conditional on the lagged dependent variable. This conditional relationship is 
depicted by marginal effects of the prime plotted in Figure 6 below. Those who had 
positive feelings about conservatives in 2000 were bolstered as much as 8.46 points in 
their feelings when exposed to a prime about Christian fundamentalists, a linked 
subordinate group. Those who had negative feelings about conservatives in 2000 were 
hampered in the feelings, falling 5.85 thermometer points. The prime had no discernible 
effect among those who were neutral toward conservatives. Taken together, these 
experiment results provide additional confidence in the observational findings presented 
above. 
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Conclusion 
 
As polarization increased over the last two decades, political ideology became a 
major cause of preferences about a politically important social group, Christian 
fundamentalists. Liberals sorted away from the group while conservatives sorted toward 
them. The group emerged as a political lightning rod, inspiring appreciation among 
conservatives and threat among liberals. Group preferences, in turn, influenced attitudes 
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towards conservatives. Though empirical analysis here focuses on this single group, 
preferences about other social groups on the front-lines of political conflict are likely 
both a cause and effect of polarization. 
These perceptions of groups are a potential non-policy dimension of coalition 
formation. Consequently, strengthening understanding of the political sources and 
consequences of social group preferences sheds light on the significant question asking if 
and how groups collaborate to influence political coalitions (Bawn et al. 2012).  
Political sorting is often considered to be a top-down process. Congressional elites 
converged within their parties and provided the mass public with consistent, identifiable 
cues (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). However, when elites clarify ideological 
distinctions in regard to social groups they introduce an environment in which average 
citizens evaluate some groups through a political lens. Political preferences then inform 
feelings about social groups. These now-politically charged feelings, in turn, influence 
views of political coalition supporters, causing further sorting of the political 
environment. Once social groups take divisive positions on hot-button issues in a well-
sorted environment, a ground-up process of polarization is initiated, introducing a 
feedback loop between broad political divisions and social group preferences. 
Consistent with elite polarization, such a cycle may be beneficial for democracy. 
Party attachments to social groups may aid those group’s policy advocacy efforts. 
Charged social group preferences clarify party distinctions, which could promote 
responsible party government (APSA 1950). Similarly, these polarized preferences about 
social groups might increase opinion consistency and participation (Hetherington 2008; 
Levendusky 2010). 
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However, the polarization of group preferences also has troubling normative 
consequences. Grand divisions such as those between the secular and the religious 
reinforce themselves. Individual political actors become increasingly unable to control of 
conflict escalation. Political difference grows ever more likely to rouse feelings of 
irreconcilability, potentially harming intergroup relations and damaging social capital. 
Such an environment may reduce prospects of compromise and optimal policy outcomes 
(Knack 2002; Sinclair 2000). If so, the feedback loop between social group preferences 
and polarization should be viewed as a vicious cycle of political sorting. Normative 
consequences aside, my results support a growing body of research suggesting that 
political divisions are entrenched within the social fabric of American life and are 
unlikely to disappear anytime soon (e.g. Alford et al. 2011; Gimpel and Schuknect 2004; 
Husser n.d.). Several questions remain about when the cycle linking subordinate groups 
with superordinate coalitions begins, what exogenous shocks initiate that linking, whether 
political or group elites are responsible, whether subordinate groups begin the cycle as a 
cause or an effect, and what conditions lead to depolarization. 
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Supporting Information A: Protestant Denomination Coding 
 
Coding of Protestant denominations is generally consistent with Layman and Green 
(2006) and Steensland et al (2000).  
 
Evangelical Protestants 
Seventh-Day Adventist, American Baptist Association, Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist 
General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist 
Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, National 
Association of Free Will Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Reformed Baptist, Southern Baptist 
Convention, Mennonite Church, Evangelical Covenant Church, Evangelical Free Church, 
Congregational Christian, Brethren in Christ, Mennonite Brethren, Christian and 
Missionary Alliance, Church of God (Anderson, Ind.), Church of the Nazarene, Free 
Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Church of God of Findlay, Ohio, 
Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America, Lutheran 
Church–Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Congregational 
Methodist, Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, Tenn.), Church of God 
(Huntsville, Al.), International Church of the Four Square Gospel, Pentecostal Church of 
God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God 
of Prophecy, Apostolic Pentecostal, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian 
Church in America, Evangelical Presbyterian, Christian Reformed Church. 
 
Note: Several small denominations are not represented in the data or the codebook does 
not fully distinguish the small denomination from a larger denominational label. For 
example, the ANES does not have a special code for Church of God of Findlay. 
 
Non-Evangelical 
Other Protestant denominations and non-denominational Protestants are coded as non-
evangelical Protestant. Given the importance of not conflating political preferences with 
religious tradition for the purposes of this paper, I break with this coding scheme in the 
case of ambiguous Protestants, which I code as non-evangelical. Layman and Green 
(2006) details in Supporting Information A: “Non-black individuals who identified 
themselves as fundamentalist, evangelical, or charismatic/spirit-filled were coded as 
evangelical Protestants.” and “Non-black individuals who identified themselves as liberal 
were coded as mainline Protestants.” While some non-denominational churches should 
ideally be classified as evangelical, it is difficult to distinguish them from those that are 
not. Placing members of evangelical non-denominational churches in the reference 
category should only make results harder to find. 
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Supporting Information B: Why Samples are Limited to White 
s 
The complex role of race in the American religious experience complicates this 
story for non-whites. The threating nature of religious and political discord is muddied 
for many non-whites because of divergence between conservative social policy 
preferences and liberal economic preferences (Sherkat et al. 2010). Both African-
Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be Christian fundamentalists than are whites. 
The 33.4 percent of whites who take a literal view of the bible is significantly less than 
the 65.6 percent of African Americans (t =13.37) and the 49.6 percent of Hispanics (t = 
6.12) who hold a literal view (ANES 2008). Correspondingly, the mean fundamentalist 
thermometer was 68.7 and 61.2 among African Americans and Hispanics, respectively, 
but only 53.8 among whites. However, African Americans and Hispanics also tend to be 
more liberal than whites. Consequently, the relationship between ideology and 
preferences about Christian fundamentalists is confounded among non-whites. 
Subsequent analyses avoid this complication to underlying assumptions by limiting 
samples to whites. 
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Supporting Information C: Religious Leaders and Political Preferences 
I argue that the archetype for a Christian fundamentalist shifted from Billy 
Graham to more politically active leaders Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. This shift 
meant that people increasingly thought of Christian fundamentalists as a political group. 
A November 2006 Newsweek telephone survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research 
Associates International asked questions about several Christian fundamentalist leaders 
along with political questions, providing data to evaluate the relationship between 
attitudes about these leaders with several political variables. Table 1C presents 
correlations between a respondent’s favorability toward a leader and various political 
views.  Unfortunately, people were only asked to evaluate the religious leaders if they 
identified as an evangelical or born-again Christians. Nonetheless, results are suggestive 
of a broader trend. Evaluations of Billy Graham and Oral Roberts, less politically active 
Christian fundamentalists, have a generally weaker relationship to political variables than 
evaluations of their more political counterparts, Falwell and Robertson. 
Table 1C: Correlations between Religious Leader Evaluations and Political Variables 
 
Billy 
Graham 
Oral 
Roberts 
Pat 
Robertson 
Jerry 
Falwell 
Bush Approval 
 
0.12 0.25 0.35 0.49 
Democratic Party Threat 
 
0.10 0.10 0.21 0.29 
Republican Party Threat 
 
0.06 0.01 0.13 0.15 
Religion's Influence on Politics 
 
0.09 0.20 0.33 0.30 
Christian Right's Influence on Politics 
 
0.20 0.19 0.38 0.37 
Christian Right's Influence on Bush 
Administration 
0.16 0.23 0.39 0.27 
Source: Newsweek Poll, 11/2006. Pairwise correlation coefficients. Sample restricted to whites. 
Ns range from 192 to 252. 
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Newsweek. 2006. “Newsweek Poll # 2006-NW08: Congressional Elections / Politics / 
Religion.” Data obtained through Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. 
 
Leader Evaluation: “We’d like your overall opinion of some different people. If I read a 
name you don't recognize, please say so. Would you say your overall opinion of [name] 
is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” (0- very 
unfavorable; 0.3333 - mostly unfavorable; 0.6666 - mostly favorable; 1 – very favorable). 
 
Bush Approval: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling 
his job as president?” (0 – Disapprove; 1 – Approve). 
 
Democratic Party Threat: “Which of the following groups, if any, do you think is a 
serious threat to the moral and religious values of people like you? Do you think the 
Democratic Party is a serious threat, or not?” (0 – no; 1 – yes) 
 
Republican Party Threat: “Which of the following groups, if any, do you think is a 
serious threat to the moral and religious values of people like you? Do you think the 
Republican Party is a serious threat, or not?” (0 – yes; 1 – no; Note: Reversed from 
above) 
 
Religion's Influence on Politics: “Do you believe that religion plays too big a role in 
American political and cultural life today, too small a role, or is it about right?” (0- Too 
big a role; 0.5 – About right ; 1- Too small a role) 
 
Christian Right's Influence on Politics: “Now I have a few questions about the 
conservative Christian political movement sometimes known as ‘the religious right.’ Do 
you think the religious right has had too much influence, too little influence, or about the 
right amount of influence on American politics over the past 25 years?” (0- Too big a 
role; 0.5 – About right ; 1- Too small a role) 
 
Christian Right's Influence on Bush Administration: “How much influence do you think 
the religious right or Christian conservative movement has had on the policies of the 
Bush administration -- too much, too little, or about the right amount?” (0- Too big a role; 
0.5 – About right ; 1- Too small a role) 
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Supporting Information D: First Stage Models 
 
Table D1: First-Stage Estimates for Table 2 
 
Param. Est. (Std. Err.) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 00 0.350*** (0.031) 
Party 00 0.207*** (0.023) 
Education 00 0.024 (0.024) 
Income 00 0.109* (0.049) 
Female -0.008 (0.014) 
South 00 0.020 (0.015) 
Thermometer: Military 00 0.002*** (0.000) 
Thermometer: Labor 00 0.000 (0.000) 
Thermometer: Women's Movement 00 0.000 (0.000) 
Constant 0.084* (0.040) 
Observations 463 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.498 
 
F 52 
 
Source: American National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2000 Conservatives Thermometer.  Sample limited to whites. 
Independent variables range from 0 to 1. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Supporting Information D: First Stage Models (cont.) 
 
Table D2: First Stage Estimates for 2SLS Models appearing in Table 3 
 
Model 1 
All 
Model 2 
Liberals 
Model 3 
Conservatives 
 
Param. Est. 
(Std. Error) 
Param. Est. 
(Std. Error) 
Param. Est. 
(Std. Error) 
Thermometer: Conservatives 2000 0.575*** 0.784*** 0.470*** 
 
(0.052) (0.081) (0.073) 
Party 2000 -0.071** -0.048 -0.057 
 
(0.028) (0.061) (0.042) 
Education 2000 -0.047 -0.051 -0.039 
 
(0.032) (0.051) (0.047) 
Income 2000 -0.053 -0.150 -0.010 
 
(0.060) (0.114) (0.079) 
Age 2000 -0.202*** -0.111 -0.268*** 
 
(0.058) (0.092) (0.083) 
Church Attendance 2000 0.004 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) 
Biblical Literalism 2000 0.145*** 0.146** 0.141*** 
 
(0.033) (0.053) (0.046) 
Prayer Frequency 2000 0.051 0.012 0.087* 
 
(0.034) (0.053) (0.050) 
Evangelical 2000 0.032 0.020 0.020 
 
(0.024) (0.045) (0.032) 
Authoritarianism 2000 0.070* 0.056 0.072 
 
(0.033) (0.052) (0.047) 
Constant 0.161*** 0.063 0.221*** 
 
(0.047) (0.070) (0.079) 
F 32.4 18.27 10.94 
N 460 141 273 
Adj. R2 0.406 0.552 0.268 
Source: American National Election Study, 2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2000 Christian Fundamentalist Thermometer.  Sample limited to whites. 
Independent variables range from 0 to 1. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Supporting Information E: OLS Models 
 
Table A: Feelings towards Christian Fundamentalists in 2004 as a function of Feelings 
toward Conservatives in 2000 
 
Param. 
Est. 
(Std. 
Error) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 00 55.54*** (4.335) 
Thermometer: Conservatives 00 17.79*** (5.708) 
Party 00 10.58*** (2.800) 
Education 00 -9.623*** (2.988) 
Income 00 -8.546 (5.985) 
Constant 16.53*** (3.196) 
Observations 477 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.475 
 Source: American National Election Study,  2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Christian Fundamentalists Thermometer. 
OLS; Sample limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed 
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Supporting Information E: OLS Models (cont.) 
 
Table B: Feelings towards Conservatives in 2004 as a function of Feelings toward 
Christian Fundamentalists in 2000 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
All Liberals Conservatives 
 Param. Est Param. Est Param. Est 
 (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) 
Thermometer: Christian Fundamentalists 00 17.69*** 27.58*** 11.05** 
 
(3.883) (8.538) (4.528) 
Thermometer: Conservatives 00 33.62*** 32.48** 30.29*** 
 
(5.139) (10.73) (6.245) 
Party 00 18.82*** 9.929 11.57*** 
 
(2.506) (6.092) (3.392) 
Education 00 -3.333 -5.266 -1.677 
 
(2.663) (4.976) (3.471) 
Income00 0.867 -14.04 5.348 
 
(5.376) (11.95) (6.260) 
Constant 22.59*** 22.16*** 33.38*** 
 
(2.857) (5.137) (4.279) 
Observations 487 154 284 
Adjusted R-squared 0.410 0.377 0.215 
Source: American National Election Study,  2000-2004 Panel 
Dependent variable is 2004 Conservative Thermometer. 
OLS; Sample limited to whites. Independent variables range from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, one-tailed 
 
 
 
 
